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“European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign
states under the Treaties may, however, not be realised in
such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient
space for the political formation of the economic, cultural and
social circumstances of life.”1
“The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the
opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to
the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to
deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they
cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such a policy
were permissible, the practical result would be that those
lawfully admitted to the country under the authority of the
acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a substantial sense
and in their full scope the privileges conferred by the
admission, would be segregated in such of the states as chose
to offer hospitality.”2

INTRODUCTION
Within the broader borders of the European Union and the United
States, a constellation of state subunits raise claims for
1. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June
30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, ¶ 249 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheid
ungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html [hereinafter BVerfG Lisbon Treaty
Decision].
2. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915).
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distinctiveness that are similar in nature, albeit different in intensity.
At the borders of the European Union and the United States,
comparable waves of immigrants press for admission and raise
claims for inclusion. The push for federal or union rule in
immigration matters, by prompting a reallocation of the power to
decide on admission, treatment and naturalization of immigrants
between center and periphery, creates a potential tension in both the
European Union and the United States between the competing
interests of state subunits in distinctiveness and of immigrants in
inclusion.3 This article highlights this tension as an entry point to
open up and assess intentions, priorities, and outcomes in E.U. and
U.S. immigration and citizenship policy. It argues that the policies
accommodate competing interests in different ways, and it questions
the reasons and consequences for different approaches. Ultimately, it
finds that a similar pursuit of national distinctiveness orients
citizenship and immigration policies in the E.U. and the U.S.; given
the different level that the “nation” occupies in the two entities, this
results in different treatment for a certain, important set of
3. In the United States, immigration powers have been in the hands of the
federal government since the late nineteenth century. See T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 12 (2002) (suggesting that at the turn of the twentieth
century, the courts began to adopt an expansive interpretation of the constitutional
authority of the United States, including the authority to control borders and the
entry of aliens); see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York City, 92 U.S. 259, 27273 (1875) (finding that Congress is entrusted with powers relating to the regulation
of the “right to land passengers” in the United States from foreign countries). The
Constitution also gives the federal government the power to devise a uniform rule
for naturalization. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. In the European Union, the original
vision of an internal market among the member states did not include plans for a
common immigration policy. In the 1990s, with the Treaty of Amsterdam,
immigration law became proper European law. See Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 1(5), 1997 O.J. (C 340)
1, 8 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (acknowledging new procedures for
crossing internal and external borders). The effort to build a common immigration
policy has been under way ever since, and it has already yielded some common
legislative standards with respect to admission, expulsion, and treatment of
immigrants. See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/114, art. 12.2, 2005 O.J. (L 375) 12,
16 (specifying when a student residence permit may be withdrawn); Council
Directive 2003/86, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 (prohibiting specific derogations from
treaty obligations); Council Directive 2009/50, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17 (providing for
residence permits to the European Community).
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immigrants’ interests in inclusion. Despite similarities in stated
intentions and in the immigration challenges that the United States
and the European Union face, the former silently protects these
interests, while they are endangered in the latter.
Individual states in a multi-tier polity share an interest in affirming
a sphere of autonomy for themselves, and in protecting their distinct
selves within the wider community. On the other hand, immigrants in
a multi-tier polity share a peculiar interest in inclusion:4 they aspire
to have a broad spectrum of rights, granted in comparable terms in
any state subunit, to freely access all those state subunits and to live
in their host polity in a condition resembling that of citizens. These
interests of states in distinctiveness and of immigrants in inclusion
find reward in different allocations of the power to decide on
admission, treatment of immigrants and naturalization between the
center and the periphery. States gain in distinctiveness if they are free
to treat citizens and immigrants in different ways and to include and
exclude at will from their legal, political and social community.5
Immigrants gain in inclusion, on the other hand, if federal or
otherwise central rule sets standard terms for their admission and
naturalization, and limits the power of individual states to exclude
them or to otherwise single them out for unfavorable treatment.6
States interests in distinctiveness are protected, in other words, by
bounding the state communities, while immigrants’ interests in
inclusion are protected by un-bounding and opening them.
4. It is to this peculiar kind of interests that this article refers to, from this
point forward, when it talks of immigrants’ interests in inclusion.
5. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 31 (1983) (referring to the political community as a “bounded
world,” which becomes the theater of fundamental distributive choices, including
the choice to distribute membership).
6. This is not meant to suggest that uniformity or coordination of rule among
the several subunits necessarily eases integration and inclusion of immigrants. It
has been argued, in contrast, that leaving room to states and localities to make their
own policy in respect of immigrants might benefit the interests of their integration.
See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1627, 1636 (1997) (suggesting that delegation of immigration power to the
states may operate as “steam-valve federalism,” whereby placing immigration
power with the states releases pressure on the national immigration structure on the
whole). What is protected by unbounding, however, is a peculiar aspect of the
immigrants’ interests in inclusion: the interest of being in a condition that
resembles, as much as possible, the one of citizens.
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Balancing these competing interests involves comparable issues in
the United States and the European Union; the two entities share a
multi-tier structure of citizenship and a double perimeter of borders,
among the states and towards foreign countries. The immigration
numbers that they confront are similar,7 as are the concerns that an
influx of immigrants generate for their polities.8
These similarities might suggest that the United States and the
European Union pursue a similar balance of distinctiveness and
inclusion. Yet, an exploration of the structures of rules of admission,
treatment of immigrants, and naturalization in the two entities reveals
that this is not the case. This article gradually draws a map of the
thickness of internal borders in the European Union and the United
States with respect to these three sets of rules: thick internal borders
signal an area of autonomy for individual states, thus protecting their
distinctiveness, while thin borders represent more homogeneous
7. In 2007, about 660,000 people naturalized into U.S. citizenship. NANCY
RYTINA & SELENA CALDERA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATURALIZATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/natz_fr_07.pdf. Estimates suggest that, in 2007, about
12.8 million legal permanent residents resided in the United States. NANCY
RYTINA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2007 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/lpr_pe_2007.pdf. In 2006, 1.8 million people, who
were not nationals of an E.U. member state, immigrated into the European Union.
See ANNE HERM, EUR. COMM’N, EUROSTAT, RECENT MIGRATION TRENDS:
CITIZENS OF EU-27 MEMBER STATES BECOME EVER MORE MOBILE WHILE EU
REMAINS ATTRACTIVE TO NON-EU CITIZENS 2-3 (2008), available at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-098/EN/KS-SF08-098-EN.PDF; see also Craig A. Parsons & Timothy M. Smeeding, What’s
Unique About Immigration in Europe, in IMMIGRATION AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 1, 5-6 (Craig A. Parsons & Timothy M. Smeeding
eds., 2006) (“Coherent data is difficult to assemble for stocks and flows of
migrants, since European countries categorize immigrants, foreign-born, and
citizens in different ways.”). The third-country national (“TCN”) population in the
E.U. in 2003 was about 23 million. GROUPE D’ÉTUDE DE DÉMOGRAPHIE
APPLIQUÉE & BERLIN INST. FOR COMP. SOC. RES., MIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN
EUROPE 2003 49 (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/
asylum/statistics/doc_annual_report_2003_en.htm.
8. See generally Parsons & Smeeding, supra note 7, at 5-20 (discussing
demographic, socio-economic, and political issues that immigration raises in
Europe); see also THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 14-17 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997)
(reviewing the economic, social, and cultural arguments that characterize the
immigration debate in the United States).
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experiences of immigrants’ inclusion. The map indicates that the
U.S. system of immigration and citizenship is more likely to protect
immigrants’ interests in inclusion rather than states’ interests in
distinctiveness; the E.U. system, by contrast, leans towards states’
interests in distinctiveness at the expense of immigrants’ interests in
inclusion.
However, an alternative narrative suggests that the United States
and the European Union actually pursue similar goals in the
organization of their respective immigration and citizenship policies:
each reaches out for national distinctiveness. That national
distinctiveness, though, pushes in different directions. In the United
States, where external borders mark a civic and cultural community,
it pushes for federal rule in immigration and citizenship. It pushes for
member states’ independence in immigration and citizenship choices
in the European Union; while common borders enclose a community
of law in which European citizens participate as economic actors, it
is the internal borders that guard distinct cultural and civic
communities. As a result, the structure of rules of admission,
treatment of immigrants, and naturalization differ; the national
distinctiveness variable alters the relative weight of states’ interests
in distinctiveness and immigrants’ interests in inclusion.
Ultimately, it is the immigrants’ interest in inclusion that faces a
different fate in the United States and the European Union. In the
United States, the immigrants’ interest in being included in each of
the several states blends with the interest in national distinctiveness.
While not often voiced, the immigrants’ interests have found
effective protection in the concentration of immigration powers at
the federal level. In the European Union, the immigrants’ interest in
supranational inclusion openly conflicts with, and succumbs to, the
interest in national distinctiveness. The very process of integration
and the strengthening of European citizenship, however, already
threaten national distinctiveness in the European Union from several
sides. For these reasons, sacrificing immigrants’ interest in inclusion
for the sake of national distinctiveness might prove ineffective: in
order to avoid a zero sum game of distinctiveness and inclusion,
choices in immigration policy in the European Union should rely on
a careful evaluation of the interests at stake.
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Despite the similar stated intentions and comparable challenges,
different obstacles confront policy- and rule-making on either side of
the Atlantic. This calls for different emphases in the pursuit of
analogous commitments. Part I of this article explores how rules on
admission, treatment of immigrants, and naturalization raise a
tension between states’ interests in distinctiveness and immigrants’
interests in inclusion through the lens of a landmark European Court
of Justice (“ECJ”) case. It maps those rules onto two notions of
internal borders: regulatory and definitional. Part II tests the
thickness of internal borders respectively in the United States and the
European Union. The map it draws shows that internal borders in the
United states are, in relevant part, mostly thin, with some thicker
spots, while in the European Union, the borders are thick overall,
with thinning segments in some parts. Part III interprets the map
created in Part II and considers the contrast in the balance of states’
and immigrants’ interests that emerges at first glance, and then turns
to an alternative narrative, which takes into account the variable of
national distinctiveness. Finally, it highlights the different destinies
of immigrants’ interests in inclusion in the United States and the
European Union, respectively.

I. STATE DISTINCTIVENESS VS. IMMIGRANTS’
INCLUSION: THE ROLE OF INTERNAL BORDERS
A. DISTINCTIVENESS VS. INCLUSION IN THE CHEN CASE
States’ interests in distinctiveness and immigrants’ interests in
inclusion are not reserved for scholarly reverie; in both the European
Union and the United States, the voices of different actors, beyond
scholars, has contributed to give them a concrete shape and
expression. Policy makers and judges, for instance, have often paid
attention to these sets of interests.
For example, courts in both the E.U. and the U.S. have addressed
states’ interests in inclusion. The German Constitutional Court, in a
recent judgment on the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, echoes
the interests of E.U. states in distinctiveness: “European unification
on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may,
however, not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not
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retain sufficient space for the political formation of the economic,
cultural and social circumstances of life.”9 On the U.S. side, implied
tributes to states’ interests in distinctiveness come from sustainers of
the compact theory, according to which the center of political life in
the U.S., and the basis of the federation political legitimacy, are the
individual states.10 Justice Thomas, for instance, dissenting in the
Term Limits case,11 emphasized that: “[e]ven at the level of national
politics, there always remains a meaningful distinction between
someone who is a citizen of the US and Georgia, and someone who
is a citizen of the US and Massachusetts.”12
Turning to immigrants’ interests in inclusion, these are taken into
account in legal and policy documents both in the U.S. and in the
E.U.13 In the E.U., the European Council in Tampere in 1999
highlighted a connection between fair treatment of third country
nationals (“TCNs”) and approximation of their condition to the one
of European citizens: “The European Union must ensure fair
treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the
territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy
9. BVerfG Lisbon Treaty Decision, supra note 1, ¶ 249.
10. Compact theory and national theory offer opposing interpretations of the
role and source of central power in the U.S. constitutional model. According to the
compact theory, the hub of political life is the state and not the nation as a whole;
there is not one people of America, but several, each expressing their political will
through the mediating role of the states. According to the national theory, through
the federal constitution, the federal states would become one sovereign power
whose ultimate source of authority would be directly in the people. See SAMUEL H.
BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 20-21,
253 (1993) (“In contrast with compact theory, national theory takes a far more
generous view of the powers and responsibilities of the federal government.”); see
also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of
the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people
of the Nation as a whole.”).
11. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 859.
12. Id.
13. The European Court of Justice has had, up to now, limited review powers
with respect to legal instruments adopted on the legal basis of Title IV of the EC
Treaty (Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice). As a result, there is little judicial
discourse on the goals and priorities of the burgeoning common immigration
policy. The discourse is much more developed in policy documents adopted by the
Council, Commission, and European Parliament. See Consolidated EC Treaty arts.
61-69, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (adopting measures that govern
the freedom to travel within the territory of the member states).
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should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to
those of E.U. citizens.”14
On the U.S. side, the Supreme Court has interpreted aliens’ interests
in having an effective right of abode in the various states. In Truax v.
Raich it found a state statute which de facto limited the ability of
aliens to find an occupation in the state to prejudice this right:15
The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the
opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully
admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion
of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.
And, if such a policy were permissible, the practical result
would be that those lawfully admitted to the country
under the authority of the acts of Congress, instead of
enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full scope the
privileges conferred by the admission, would be
segregated in such of the states as chose to offer
hospitality.16
“Segregation” of immigrants in a selection of states willing to host
them would conflict with immigrants’ interests in inclusion.
Both in the U.S. and in the E.U., these valued interests of states in
distinctiveness and of immigrants in inclusion potentially lead to
tension in the frame of rules on admission, inclusion, and treatment
of immigrants. The kind of rules that would reinforce state
distinctiveness indeed tends to sacrifice immigrants’ interests in
inclusion. The Chen case, a landmark case, decided in 2004 by the
ECJ, and involving contrasting claims of some E.U. member states
and of some TCNs, effectively portrays this tension.17
14. Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Oct. 16, 1999)
[hereinafter Presidency Conclusions], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
summits/tam_en.htm.
15. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (striking down a state statute
requiring every employer of more than five employees to employ at least eighty
percent native-born citizens).
16. Id. at 42.
17. See Case C-200/02, Zhu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R.
I-9925 (construing the issue presented to the court as whether a minor citizen of
the European Union, currently in the primary care of her mother, a foreign
national, has the right to reside in another member state, and, if so, whether the
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Mrs. Chen and her husband were Chinese nationals and worked
for a Chinese company in China; Mr. Chen traveled frequently to the
United Kingdom for business purposes.18 In 2000, Mrs. Chen went to
Belfast, Northern Ireland (a constituent country of the United
Kingdom), to deliver her second child. This allowed her baby,
Catherine, to acquire Irish nationality (in the Republic of Ireland) at
birth under Irish nationality law in force at the time,19 and thus also
to automatically acquire European citizenship under Article 17 of the
E.C. Treaty.20 However, “in enacting the British Nationality Act
1981, the United Kingdom departed from the jus soli, so that birth in
the territory of that Member State no longer automatically confers
United Kingdom nationality.”21 As such, Catherine did not
automatically acquire British nationality simply by virtue of being
born in the United Kingdom.
Relying on the fact that her daughter was a European citizen, Mrs.
Chen subsequently applied for a long-term residence permit for
herself and Catherine in the United Kingdom, but British authorities
denied such permit.22 The Immigration Appellate Authority, to whom
the Chens challenged the refusal of the residence permit, referred a
number of questions to the ECJ on the rights of Catherine and Mrs.
Chen under European law.23 The ECJ ultimately supported Mrs.
Chen’s claim: Catherine was indeed a European citizen and she was
validly claiming a right of residence under Article 18 of the E.C.
Treaty.24 The Court also held that in order to make effective
mother may also reside there).
18. Id. ¶ 7.
19. See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, art. l(vi), Apr. 10,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 751 (1998) (confirming the people of Northern Ireland’s “right to
hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments”).
20. Id. ¶¶ 8-11; EC Treaty art.17.
21. Id. ¶ 10. The British Nationality Act, in conjunction with Irish law then in
force, had the peculiar result of allowing those born in part of the United Kingdom
(Northern Ireland) to gain access to European Union citizenship through the
Republic of Ireland (as Catherine was able to do), while preventing those born in
the rest of the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, or Wales) from doing the same
by denying them the requisite underlying nationality in a member state.
22. Case C-200/02, Zhu, ¶ 2.
23. Id. ¶ 15.
24. See id. ¶ 26 (“Purely as a national of a Member State, and therefore as a
citizen of the Union, Catherine is entitled to rely on Article 18(1) EC.” ); EC
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Catherine’s right to move and reside in the United Kingdom as an
E.U. citizen, her mother, the parent-care taker, was entitled to a coextensive residence permit in the United Kingdom.25
While the Chen case was on the ECJ docket, Ireland held a
referendum in which relevant constitutional provisions regarding
nationality were amended: Ireland qualified its traditional jus soli
rule for the conferral of citizenship by specifying that, if no parent
was an Irish citizen at the time of a child’s birth, additional
conditions would apply in order for the child to be a citizen.26
Competing interests of member states in distinctiveness and of
immigrants in inclusion may be discerned in the folds of the Chen
saga. Mrs. Chen sought supranational inclusion in the European
Union for herself and for her daughter: she was seeking rights in one
member state, Ireland, to export them to another member state, the
United Kingdom. Ireland, on the other hand, felt its power to include
and exclude by granting or denying citizenship, and consequently an
important aspect of its distinctiveness, to be under threat: its
nationality rule based on jus soli attracted immigrants interested in
making instrumental use of it rather than in becoming Irish.
Similarly, the United Kingdom was reluctant to open its borders to
the residence claim of a dubious European citizen and her TCN
mother; it resisted the pressure of European law in this sense, and
raised arguments to protect its bounded community and its own
capacity to include and exclude immigrants through the grant and
denial of residence rights.27
Treaty art. 18 (guaranteeing E.U. citizens the right to move and reside freely in any
member state).
25. Case C-200/02, Zhu, ¶¶ 45-46.
26. Amendments to the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 (Act No.
38/2004) (Ir.), available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2004/
a3804.pdf (last visited June 26, 2010) (specifying that a child becomes an Irish
national at birth only if, at the time of his or her birth, at least one of the parents
was an Irish citizen or had resided in Ireland for three of the four years
immediately preceding the birth); see Ciara Smyth & Donncha O’Connell, The
Irish Citizenship Referendum of 2004: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, in
MIGRATION, DIASPORAS AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 127, 132-35 (Prakash
Shah & Werner F. Menski eds., 2006) (explaining that this change came about in
part as a result of the Chen case, and in part as a response discomfort over the
presence of large numbers of illegal immigrants giving birth to baby citizens in the
territory of the Republic).
27. See Case C-200/02, Zhu, ¶¶ 14, 18, 29 (describing the United Kingdom and
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The distinctiveness/inclusion contrast takes shape in this case
around the operation of three kinds of rules. First, rules of admission:
on the one hand, Mrs. Chen’s and Catherine’s claims for a residence
permit in the United Kingdom, and on the other, the United
Kingdom’s attempt to deny the permit. Second, nationality rules: on
the one hand, Mrs. Chen’s claim for inclusion by giving birth in
Northern Ireland, and on the other, Ireland’s reaction to defend its
distinctiveness by changing its citizenship rules. Third, rules on the
treatment of immigrants: the competing claims of Mrs. Chen for free
movement rights and for a residence permit, and of the United
Kingdom for the satisfaction of additional requirements. These rules
raise a number of issues: which conditions do immigrants need to
meet to benefit from European Union-wide rights of movement, and
which level of inclusion can they claim by means of family
reunification? How much can member states discriminate between
their own citizens and European citizens, and between European
citizens and TCNs? Is this type of discrimination still a viable avenue
for states to affirm their distinctiveness?
The Chen case stretches the rules of European citizenship to their
extreme to protect inclusion while soliciting the utmost reaction in
the name of distinctiveness on the part of Ireland and the United
Kingdom. In this way, it shows clearly how a multi-tier entity’s rules
of admission, treatment of immigrants, and grant of citizenship
generate a tension between competing interests of states in
distinctiveness and of immigrants in inclusion.

B. THE ROLE OF INTERNAL BORDERS
Whether it is distinctiveness or inclusion that wins in this contest
depends on the thickness of the polity’s internal borders for purposes
of each one of the three sets of rules. Again, the Chen case is
enlightening in this sense: Mrs. Chen and her family, on the one
hand, and the involved member states on the other, each raise claims
for internal borders of different thickness. Mrs. Chen wanted thin

Ireland’s arguments that Catherine could not exercise rights under the European
Treaties because she was under age, that she had never exercised a right of
movement, that rights of free movement under European law are conditioned upon
the availability of sufficient resources, and Catherine, while benefiting from her
parents’ financial support, had no resources of her own).
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borders for the purpose of having herself and her daughter admitted
into the United Kingdom, and she relied on European law to this
extent. The United Kingdom wanted to keep the border thick and
thus challenged the bite of European law in this case. Mrs. Chen also
wanted thin internal borders for the purpose of inclusion as a citizen,
as she wanted her daughter to be able to exercise her rights of
citizenship, acquired in Ireland, in the United Kingdom. Ireland and
the United Kingdom wanted those same internal borders to be thick:
the United Kingdom resisted the claim that the grant of nationality of
another member state heightened Catherine’s claim for inclusion in
the United Kingdom. Ireland quickly changed its rules, showing that,
even if the status of inclusion that one gains through nationality is
exportable to some extent, the grant at its origin is still entirely the
member state’s decision according to the criteria that it sets. Finally,
Mrs. Chen wanted thin internal borders for the purpose of her rights
as an immigrant; she wanted to be able to join her family member in
another member state and to have a right of residence there as well.
The United Kingdom, on the contrary, wanted the border to be thick
so that it would have greater discretion in imposing conditions and
requirements on a TCN’s ability to claim rights within its territory as
a family member of a European citizen and, in general, as an
immigrant.
The thickening or thinning of internal borders may thus contribute
to the allocation of legal resources in a multi-tier polity between the
competing interests of states in distinctiveness and of immigrants in
inclusion: the thickening of internal borders in this case would have
strengthened the claims of Ireland and the United Kingdom, while
their thinning would have strengthened the Chens’ claims.
Two notions of internal borders, in particular, are important for
drawing a map that may help unravel the tension between
distinctiveness and inclusion. In one sense, internal borders have a
regulatory role: thick regulatory borders identify individual states as
separate and autonomous spaces of regulation;28 thin regulatory

28. Health and police power, for instance, represent fields where internal
regulatory borders are thick in the United States. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate
trade . . . , it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its
citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.”).
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borders are permeable to coordinated, mutually recognized, or
centrally harmonized regulation.29 If internal regulatory borders are
thick with respect to admission rules, individual states will decide
their own categories of visas and residence permits for immigrants
from third countries, and it is possible that these visas and permits
will be limited in validity to the territory of individual states. If they
are thick with respect to treatment of immigrants, individual states
will enjoy wider discretion in diversifying the status of aliens within
their borders and in putting them at an advantage or at a disadvantage
with respect to citizens. If regulatory borders are thick with respect to
naturalization rules, rules for access to citizenship will differ in
different states; they might give access to a peripheral, sub-central
status of citizenship, from which the common citizenship derives
according to a rule of automation or derivation. Thin regulatory
borders, on the contrary, may find expression in common admission
visas or in visas and permits that are otherwise recognized and
honored in more than one state; in shared standards and rules for the
treatment of immigrants while they remain aliens; and in common
criteria for naturalization and access to citizenship, taking into
account the duration of residence and employment, and the overall
integration of immigrants in more than just one state.
In another sense, internal borders have a definitional role: they
mark a certain idea of polity. They might enclose a community with
a distinct identity in social, political, and cultural terms, or they
might demarcate a region or administratively decentralized unit of
the central polity with no strong identity of its own. Admission and
naturalization rules, which set integration requirements for
prospective entrants and prospective citizens, for instance, may
evidence the thickness of internal definitional borders: if individual
states can require of entrants and people seeking naturalization
proofs of acquaintance with their own laws and tradition, of affinity
with their internal societies, and of allegiance to their intimate polity,
29. In the European Union, the principle of mutual recognition, as with respect
to the free movement of goods, is an example of thinning of internal regulatory
borders.
See
generally
Case
120/78,
Rewe-Zentral
AG
v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R 649 (finding that
imposing a minimum alcohol content requirement for the sale of alcoholic
beverages is incompatible with Article 30 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (the Treaty of Rome)).
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this signals that they form autonomous identity poles, and that they
draw around their territory a perimeter of thick definitional borders.
Looking at rules on admission, treatment of outsiders, and
naturalization through the lens of these two notions of internal
borders helps to frame questions that open up the tension between
states’ interests in distinctiveness and immigrants’ interests in
inclusion. Thin internal borders, both regulatory and definitional,
mean for immigrants a wider spectrum of inclusion and a similarity
of status to that of a citizen; for individual states, they mean however
a measure of overlap which may harm distinctiveness. Thick internal
borders warrant more distinctiveness for the states, but are also a
threat for the immigrants’ experiences of inclusion in the wider
polity. The following section relies on these notions of borders to
explore regimes of admission, treatment of immigrants, and
naturalization in the United States and the European Union.

TABLE 1 INTERNAL BORDERS CLASSIFICATION
Thin:

REGULATORY
Thick:

Central
regulation,
harmonized
regulation,
mutual
recognition

Autonomous
local
regulation,
divergent
regulation

Thin:

DEFINITIONAL
Thick:

Overlapping
identities of
the individual
states

Distinct identity
for individual
states; distinct
integration
requirements for
entrants and
prospective
citizens

II. A MAP OF U.S. AND E.U. INTERNAL BORDERS
This part examines U.S. and E.U. rules of admission, treatment of
immigrants, and naturalization, in order to determine whether
internal borders are thin or thick in these respects. It gradually draws
a map of the relevant internal borders, which may help in
understanding the European and American balance of states’
interests in distinctiveness and immigrants’ interests in inclusion.
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A. ADMISSION AND TREATMENT OF IMMIGRANTS
Rules on admission come together to create a pool of potential
citizens; rules on the treatment of immigrants while they remain
aliens provide a mirror image of the condition of citizens. Mapping
both sets of rules on internal borders evidences the extent to which
internal frontiers mark autonomous spaces of inclusion and
exclusion. Autonomous spaces of inclusion and exclusion would
provide an avenue of expression for state distinctiveness; however,
they also contribute to the fragmentation of immigrants’ experience
of inclusion.
1. Admission and Treatment of Immigrants in the U.S.
a. Admission
The power of handling immigration in the U.S. is a plenary power
of the federal government.30 States had some immigration powers in
the nineteenth century; they adopted regulations regarding the
inspection and acceptance of immigrants, and they had the power to
screen off certain categories of immigrants, mainly on the basis of
wealth, health, and race considerations.31 Courts initially upheld the
power of the states to regulate in the field of immigration.32 The 1875
case of Henderson v. New York, however, established that state law
regulating immigration is unconstitutional, as it impinges on the
exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce.33
30. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 16 (describing the meaning and scope of
the notion of plenary power, which gives Congress “virtually unlimited” powers in
the area of admissions to the United States).
31. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841 (1993) (describing five categories of
immigration policies left to the states: “regulation of the movement of criminals;
public health regulation; regulation of the movement of the poor; regulation of
slavery; and other policies of racial subordination”); see also William S. Bernard,
Immigration: History of U.S. Policy, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
ETHNIC GROUPS 486, 488-489 (Stephan Thernstrom et al. eds., 1980) (explaining
that regulation of immigration was largely left to states with major ports:
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland).
32. See Mayor of New York City v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837) (upholding New
York City’s regulation of immigrants as an exercise of the police power).
33. Henderson v. Mayor of New York City, 92 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1875)
(striking down a New York City tax on immigrants as an unlawful regulation of
foreign commerce, a power which the Constitution reserves to Congress).
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As part of its immigration power, the federal government regulates
admission. Admission can take place on the basis of two broad
categories of visas: immigrant and non-immigrant.34 In order to gain
admission, both immigrant and non-immigrant entrants must comply
with specific requirements and may not fall within any of the
inadmissibility grounds listed in relevant legislation.35 Immigrants
that enter on a non-immigrant visa are considered temporary
visitors.36 Those who come in on immigrant visas, instead,
immediately become lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”) and are
on a track to qualify for citizenship.37 There are four broad categories
for admission as immigrants: family-sponsored,38 employmentbased,39 diversity,40 and refugees and asylees.41 Each one of these
categories faces an annually established numerical limit, with the

34. Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] § 221, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1201(a)(1)
(LexisNexis 2010).
35. See INA § 212 (outlining conditions of inadmissibility, including healthrelated, criminal, and security grounds).
36. See MACREADIE BARR ET AL., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NONIMMIGRANT
ADMISSIONS TO THE U.S.: 2007 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/ois_ni_fr_2007.pdf. (distinguishing temporary visitors
as those who generally visit for “business or pleasure, academic or vocational
study, temporary employment, and to act as a representative of a foreign
government or international organization”).
37. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS & POLICY 265 (5th ed. 2003) (clarifying that permanent
residents may remain in the United States indefinitely, on the condition that they
do not become deportable through the commission of crimes or other prohibited
acts); see also PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS:
ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 187-89 (1998) (explaining that while
LPRs are on track for citizenship, they are not granted the right to vote, serve on a
jury, or run or be appointed for certain offices, and they are less able to sponsor
family members for immigration).
38. INA § 203(a).
39. Id. § 203(b).
40. Id. § 203(c) (awarding a certain number of immigrant visas every year,
through a lottery, to applicants of qualifying nationalities who meet certain
minimal requirements); see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 282 (describing
the motivation for the diversity lottery as an attempt to preserve the pluralist,
multi-national image of the United States as a country that welcomes immigrants
from different parts of the world). The qualifying nationalities for the lottery are
determined each year through a formula which takes into account the immigration
statistics of the previous five years and tends to exclude nationalities which have
been overrepresented in recent immigration fluxes. Id.
41. INA § 207.
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exception of family-sponsored immigration of immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens, who face no annual quotas.42 There are thus several
legal channels for admission to the United States; all of them are
based on federal legislation so that, notwithstanding the segment of
the U.S. air, land, or sea borders through which an immigrant
physically passes, her legal title to admission will not change. In this
respect, internal regulatory borders in the United States have thinned
up to the point of vanishing since the Nineteenth Century.
b. Treatment of Immigrants
The thickness of internal borders in respect to the treatment of
immigrants in the United States depends on the answer to two
questions. First, what does the federal government do to determine
the status of admitted immigrants, the benefits they are entitled to,
and the rights and limitations they face? Second, to what extent and
in what ways can the various states affect the condition of immigrant
aliens?43
With regard to the first question, the answer is very little; federal
immigrants’ law is limited. From time to time, the federal
government has put in place programs in favor of immigrants: these
programs are aimed at fostering the learning of the English language,
at detecting discrimination against foreigners with regard to
employment, and at reimbursing plans for schools, states, and
localities that had to provide aid to relevant groups of immigrants.
However, the states have a more prominent role in promoting the
integration of immigrants.44 On the other hand, with the 1996 welfare
reform, the federal government has intervened to limit the rights of

42. INA § 201.
43. In this section, I use the term “immigrant” in a general sense, referencing
both LPRs and non-immigrant visitors into the United States. As this article mostly
concerns the claims of immigrants who want to build a life in their host country,
the category of LPRs is the one that attracts primary attention, but this section also
discusses the category of visitors.
44. See Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, After Arrival: An Overview of
Federal Immigrant Policy in the United States, in IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY:
THE INTEGRATION OF AMERICA’S NEWEST ARRIVALS 251, 251 (Barry Edmonston
& Jeffrey S. Passel eds., 1994) (describing federal immigration policy as liberal
and “largely laissez-faire,” thus placing the onus on states to facilitate immigrants’
assimilation).
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immigrants by significantly reducing the eligibility of aliens for both
federal and state welfare benefits.45
In regard to the second question, while states are allowed to adopt
policies favorable to aliens, making them eligible for state provided
benefits and providing for targeted means of inclusion,46 the equal
protection doctrine, which protects aliens and citizens alike, presents
an obstacle to singling out aliens for treatment less favorable than
that reserved for citizens.47 While the federal government can draw
lines between aliens and citizens without employing any judicial test
more rigorous than rational basis for equal protection purposes,48
state-based discrimination of aliens is considered inherently suspect
and subject to strict scrutiny in court; so held the Supreme Court in
Graham vs. Richardson.49 In that case, the Court found that state
statutes, which make access to welfare benefits dependent upon
citizenship or upon a durational residency requirement for aliens, are
unconstitutional because they conflict with the equal protection

45. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 [PRWORA], 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-45, § 1611(a) (West 2010) (declaring that
aliens who are not permanent residents and do not belong to a few other privileged
categories are not eligible for any kind of federal public benefit). Ineligibility for
supplemental security income and food stamps is extended even to permanent
residents. Id. § 1612(a). Federal means-tested public benefits are only available to
qualified aliens, even permanent residents, five years after entry into the United
States. Id. § 1613(a). State and local benefits are categorically foreclosed to aliens
that are not permanent residents or non-immigrant aliens; for these latter two
categories, states remain free to decide eligibility on their own. Id. §§ 1621-22.
46. See Nathan Glazer, Governmental and Nongovernmental Roles in the
Absorption of Immigrants in the United States, in PATHS TO INCLUSION, THE
INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 59, 67-70
(Peter H. Schuck & Rainer Münz eds., 1998) (describing Massachusetts’ efforts
between 1985 and 1991 to provide to immigrants as many benefits as allowable
under federal law).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
48. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-83 (1976) (declining to strike down
a Social Security Act provision denying eligibility for a supplemental insurance
program to all aliens not admitted for permanent residence and present in the
United States for at least five years because Congress is afforded great deference in
immigration policy choices and the imposed requirements are not “wholly
irrational”).
49. 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny where state welfare laws
discriminated against aliens).

988

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:969

clause.50 Therefore, internal regulatory borders cannot mark areas of
heightened exclusion.
Rights to family reunification provide an additional important test
case for the relative role of federal and state governments in affecting
the treatment of immigrants, and thus may provide additional insight
on the two questions introduced above. Indeed, the notion of
“family” relevant to family reunification rights may either be
established in immigration law or borrowed from the field of family
law;51 as family law is largely state-based in the United States, this
might give states an opportunity to indirectly affect the condition of
immigrants.
Federal and state determinations concur in deciding what qualifies
as “family” for purposes of the concrete exercise of family
reunification rights. The case of marriage, the legal link at the basis
of the family relationship, provides a valuable example in this sense.
The general rule is that marriage is valid for immigration purposes if
it was valid in the place where it was celebrated. 52 This rule admits
of some exceptions, with regard to unions, which might be
considered offensive to public policy in the place of destination:53 for
instance, polygamous marriages are considered to offend U.S. public
policy.54 Additionally, the Immigration and Nationality Act
specifically disqualifies certain kinds of marriages for purposes of
obtaining immigration rights.55 As a result, the determination of
50. Id.
51. Compare INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1153 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining
family for purposes of family sponsorship in immigration law as sons, daughters,
spouses, and siblings) with, e.g., Wood v. Estate of Lewis, 167 S.W. 666, 669 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1914) (defining a family as “a collective body of persons who live in one
home, under one head or management”).
52. E.g. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
36.02.2(a) (rev. ed. 2003).
53. Developments in the Law, The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1996, 2035 (2003); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 303.
54. See Matter of Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308-09 (B.I.A. 1973) (denying
a visa for the spouse of an LPR where the LPR was married to an additional
woman and could not demonstrate termination of that marriage). The decision
explicitly noted that while Jordanian law allows polygamous marriages, they
“offend the public policy of the United States.” Id.
55. See INA § 101(a)(35) (excluding marriages where the purported spouses
“are not [both] physically present” at the ceremony); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 37, at 303 (noting that the INA excludes “proxy marriages”).
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whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes has been
described as a two-step process under which it must be determined:
first, whether the marriage in question is valid under the relevant
state law; and second, whether such marriage is also valid for
purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act.56
In terms of which regulatory borders, internal or external, are
relevant to determine the notion of “family” for reunification
purposes, the rule has, in practice, cut both ways depending on the
issue at hand. For same sex marriage, for instance, case law holds
that, while some states now allow such unions, the Immigration and
Nationality Act cannot be interpreted to include them.57 Federal
legislation adopted in 1996 seems to confirm this holding by
explicitly defining marriage as a heterosexual union.58 With respect
to same sex marriage thus, it is federal law and external regulatory
borders which are key. Incestuous unions also pose a challenge to the
traditional concept of marriage: here, on the contrary, state categories
and internal regulatory borders play an important role. In several
relevant cases, courts have held that incestuous marriages may be
valid for immigration purposes if they are valid in the place of
celebration and in the state of destination, or if the cohabitation of
the spouses in the state of destination would not give rise to criminal
sanctions.59 For instance, in the case of a U.S. citizen and a
Portuguese citizen, uncle and niece, married in Portugal, where this
kind of union is allowed, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
held that the marriage conferred immigration status on the
Portuguese spouse; indeed, in California, their state of proposed
residence in the United States, they would not have incurred any
criminal sanction for cohabiting.60 Another relevant case touched
upon the situation of two first cousins, one of U.S. nationality and
one of Italian nationality, who got married in South Carolina in order
56. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing United
States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970)).
57. See id. at 1040 (finding no intention to include same sex unions in the INA
or its legislative history).
58. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 [DOMA] § 3(a)7, Pub. L. No. 104-199,
110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)); see
also Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 2006 (contrasting marriage
equality developments in states with federal codification of traditional marriage).
59. GORDON ET AL., supra note 52, § 36.02.5(a).
60. Matter of E., 4 I. & N. Dec. 239, 239 (B.I.A. 1951).
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to avoid the prohibition of incestuous marriage in their residence
state of Wisconsin. There, the BIA held that the marriage could not
“confer immediate relative status” on the Italian spouse.61 While
arguably these cases are marginal, they account for the curious way
in which internal regulatory borders have come to impact federal
immigration decisions and affect the status of immigrants.
The status of immigrants in the United States appears thus split
between a predominant federal dimension and a more subtle, but not
irrelevant, state one: different states might provide more or less
welcoming environments and, in some cases, the state of settlement
might also affect the ability of an immigrant to sponsor family
members. While internal borders are thus generally thin in this
respect, their thickness is irregular and tends to increase in
unexpected ways.
2. Admission and Treatment of Immigrants in the E.U.
a. Admission
In the European Union, admission rights are the result of the
overlap and combination of national and Community competences.
A first set of European immigration rules has been adopted among a
restricted group of member states through the intergovernmental
frame of the Schengen agreement.62
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
entered into the Schengen Agreement in June 1985.63 The
participating states agreed on measures of immediate effect for
relaxing controls on persons and goods crossing their internal
borders;64 other provisions in the agreement introduced
61. Matter of Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439, 439, 442 (B.I.A. 1967) (dismissing
the case on the grounds that marriages entered into in other states for the purposes
of “knowingly evad[ing]” the marriage provisions of Wisconsin law are null and
void).
62. Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on
the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14, 1985, 2000
O.J. (L 239) 13 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement].
63. Id.
64. See id. arts. 1-2, 11 (restricting border police to “simple visual
surveillance” of persons instead of traffic stops, and agreeing to waive certain
border checks of goods).
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harmonization measures for issues relevant to the handling of
common external borders.65 Other member states joined the
Schengen system in subsequent years, including Italy in 1990 and
Spain and Portugal in 1991.66 The 1985 Schengen Agreement was
integrated and implemented with a 1990 Convention providing,
among other things, for the complete abolition of controls at internal
borders, with exceptions only for reasons of public policy and
national security.67
The Schengen system operated in a domain parallel to, and
separate from, that of the European Treaties until the late 1990s. In
1992, the Treaty of Maastricht expanded the scope of the project of
European integration by adding two intergovernmental “pillars” to
the existing first pillar on the internal market: the second pillar
focused on cooperation in foreign and security policy, and the third
pillar concerned cooperation in justice and home affairs.68
Significantly, the third pillar touched upon themes relevant to the
concrete handling of borders and immigration.69 The subsequent
65. See id. arts. 7-16 (coordinating police authorities and licensing systems for
commercial transport, among other things).
66. David O’Keeffe, The Schengen Convention: A Suitable Model for
European Integration? 11 Y.B. EUR. L. 185, 186 (1991) [hereinafter O’Keeffe,
The Schengen Convention] (suggesting that the Schengen Agreement was
motivated initially by the potential economic benefits that would flow from
diminished border controls, but that its relevance evolved toward a more
immigration- and asylum-centric focus).
67. Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985
Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of
Checks at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, arts. 1-2, 2000 O.J. (L239) 19,
20 [hereinafter Schengen Implementing Convention]. See generally O’Keeffe, The
Schengen Convention, supra note 66 (examining the two Schengen agreements and
their impact on free movement of persons).
68. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Title V-VI,
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5, 13-28 (directing the Union to “define and
implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and
security policy” and to “develop[] common action . . . in the fields of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal affairs”).
69. See David O’Keeffe, Can the Leopard Change its Spots? Visas,
Immigration and Asylum–Following Amsterdam, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE
AMSTERDAM TREATY 271, 271-72 (David O’Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds.,
1999) (characterizing the new changes as “radically alter[ing]” the existing visa,
asylum, and immigration structure); cf. GEORGIA PAPAGIANNI, INSTITUTIONAL AND
POLICY DYNAMICS OF EU MIGRATION LAW 16-21 (2006) (“[I]t has been rightly

992

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[25:969

1997 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new Title IV in the E.C.
Treaty that “communitarized” borders and immigration policy by
introducing a new Title IV devoted to this in the E.C. Treaty.70 The
Treaty of Amsterdam also incorporated the Schengen acquis—the
original agreement and convention and all the measures adopted
thereunder—into the Treaties system in the form of a separate,
attached protocol.71 This was an important step forward as it made
measures adopted in the fields of immigration and handling of
borders subject to ordinary Community procedures, to judicial
review, and to European Parliament challenges.72
The evolution of the Schengen system and the expansion of the
Title IV competence of the European Community have certainly led
to the thinning of internal regulatory borders in matters of admission,
but not to the extent of replacing member states’ choices in this field
with Community choices. For instance, the Schengen agreements
provide for uniform visas for short stays in the Schengen area, but
the issuance of visas for stays exceeding three months remains a
competence of the member states.73
Under Title IV of the E.C. Treaty, instruments have been adopted
which provide for uniform terms of admission for certain categories
of entrants. This is the case for students, unpaid trainees, and
volunteers under a 2004 directive, and for researchers under a 2005
directive.74 Indeed, where instruments adopted on the basis of Article
63 of the E.C. Treaty provide for minimum standards for the grant
and withdrawal of refugee status and for the reception of asylum
seekers, there is also in place a certain level of harmonization in

argued [that] the . . . third pillar was much more of a coordination of the work of
all the pre-existing groups, rather than a genuinely new framework.”).
70. Treaty of Amsterdam art. 1(12).
71. Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the
European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 93.
72. Other measures have contributed to the advancement of immigration law in
the European Union, a well. For example, member states recently ratified the
Treaty of Lisbon, which expands the use of the ordinary legislative procedure,
based on qualified majority voting, in the field of borders and immigration. Treaty
of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community art. 2, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C306) 43.
73. Schengen Implementing Convention, supra note 67, tit. II, art. 5.
74. Council Directive 2004/114, supra note 3, pmbl. ¶ 2; Council Directive
2005/71, pmbl. ¶ 5, 2005 O.J. (L 289) 15.
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regard to admission for humanitarian reasons.75 For these categories
of people, arguably, internal regulatory borders are thinning.
With respect to economic migration, though, internal borders
remain significantly thick. However, several Community instruments
have called for common standards in this field, as well.76 In May
2009, a long expected directive on admission of TCNs for highly
qualified employment entered into force.77 The directive establishes a
fast-track procedure and favorable conditions for the admission of
TCNs for purposes of employment that requiring a higher education
or at least five years of prior professional experience.78 According to
the directive, qualifying applicants shall receive a blue card, issued
by the member states, which will allow them to enter and re-enter the
relevant member state.79 The directive is limited to an arguably
narrow sector of labor migration, but it induces a concrete thinning
impulse for internal borders in the field of economic migration.
The European scenario of admission thus appears to be one in
which internal regulatory borders are gradually thinning, but in a
spotty and irregular way, and to the benefit of only certain categories
of entrants. The E.U. immigration policy concurs with the
immigration policies of the member states, making multiple and
overlapping categories of admission and thinning segments of

75. See Council Directive 2005/85, pmbl. ¶ 3, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13 (stressing
“common standards for fair and efficient asylum procedures in the Member
States”); Council Directive 2004/83, pmbl. ¶ 6, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (addressing
the importance of “common criteria” for those seeking international protection, as
well as “ensur[ing] that a minimum level of benefits is available for these persons”
throughout the European Union); Council Regulation 343/2003, pmbl. ¶ 2, 2003
O.J. (L 050) 1 (setting criteria for evaluation of asylum applications within a
“Common European Asylum System,” and asserting that all member states “are
considered as safe countries for third-country nationals”).
76. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of
Entry and Residence of Third Country Nationals for the Purpose of Paid
Employment and Self-Employed Economic Activities, at 3-4, COM (2001) 386 final
(Jul. 11, 2001) (proposing, unsuccessfully, standards for admission of TCNs for
employment purposes); Commission Green Paper on an EU Approach to
Managing Economic Migration, at 5, 12, COM (2004) 811 final (Jan. 11, 2005)
(detailing rationales for harmonization in economic immigration provisions).
77. Council Directive 2009/50, supra note 3.
78. Id. arts. 2(g), 5.
79. Id. art. 7.
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internal regulatory borders, but with the contextual persistence of
other thick ones.
b. Treatment of Immigrants
As underlined above, admission rights have a spotty character in
the European Union, and the condition of admitted TCNs also tends
to be spotty throughout Europe: TCNs’ specific status, their
residence permits, and their family status will depend on whether
they were admitted under national or domestic law. The fragmented,
yet persisting, internal regulatory borders for admission extend their
long shadow to color also the status of TCNs even after they have
been admitted.
Thus, in order to detect how relevant internal regulatory borders
are in respect to their treatment and in the course of their possible
escalation to membership, the questions to be asked in regard to
immigrants in Europe are slightly different from the ones posed for
the United States: do provisions of European law somehow exercise
a pull towards equalizing the status of differently admitted
immigrants throughout Europe by bringing them under a European
umbrella of rights and protections? Do these provisions somehow
constrain the freedom of the member states to discriminate between
their own citizens, and TCNs? The answers to these questions lay the
foundation for understanding whether there is a common European
status for immigrants and whether the thickness of internal
regulatory borders is correspondingly decreasing.
First indications of a European commitment to provide commonly
for the status of TCNs can be found in the previously mentioned
conclusions of the European Council meeting in Tampere in 1999:
approximation of the status of TCNs to the status of European
citizens became, in this context, a Community objective.80 In part as
a way to give body to the Tampere agenda, two directives were
adopted in 2003 providing for rights of long-term residence and
rights to family reunification for TCNs. 81 As a result of this
80. See Presidency Conclusions, supra note 14, ¶¶ 18, 21 (arguing that TCNs
need “legal status” and “rights and obligations comparable to those of E.U.
citizens” in order to integrate).
81. See Council Directive 2003/86, supra note 3 (imploring member states to
extend family reunification rights to TCNs where they legally reside within a
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legislation, there is now a minimum of equal rights that all entering
TNCs enjoy, notwithstanding the part of the Union in which they
have settled. The codification and implementation of these European
law rights for TCNs correspondingly reduces the ability of the
member states to autonomously intervene on the status of
immigrants, differentiating in their rights and residence conditions.
In terms of residence, under the new regime, TNCs are entitled to
an E.U.-law long-term residence permit after five years of lawful
residence in one member state, provided that they satisfy certain
resources requirements.82 While the European long-term residence
permit per se emphasizes the European dimension in the status of an
immigrant, its regulation surrenders to the magnetism of internal
borders in some relevant respects: to qualify for this permit, a TCN
needs to have resided for five years, not in the European Union at
large, but in the same member state: cumulating periods of residence
in different member states is not an option.83 Additionally, the permit
of permanent residence so obtained, and the pertaining rights, regard
exclusively the member state in which the permit was granted.84
In the European case, as in the U.S. one, the field of family
reunification might provide insight with respect to the role of
European law relative to that of of member states in shaping the
status of immigrants. With regard to family reunification, European
law provides for relevant rights to the benefit of both family
members of TCNs and of TCN family members of migrant European

member state and have family member seeking to enter the European Union, but
leaving the decision of what constitutes “family” for the purposes of family
reunification to each individual member state); Council Directive 2003/109, 2004
O.J. (L 16) 44 (addressing long-term resident TCNs).
82. Council Directive 2003/109, supra note 81, arts. 4, 5.1(a).
83. Id. art. 4. The recently adopted blue card directive provides for an
exception: TCNs who have been admitted to a member state for purposes of highly
qualified employment under the terms of the directive may move to a second
member state for purposes of highly qualified employment after eighteen months
of residence in the first one, and they can subsequently cumulate, on certain
conditions, the residence time spent in different member states for purposes of
obtaining the E.U. long-term residence permit. Council Directive 2009/50, supra
note 3, art. 16.2.
84. See Council Directive 2003/109, supra note 81, art. 14 (elaborating that,
despite exclusivity of permit, long-term residence status entitles a TCN to move to
and reside in a second member state).
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citizens.85 European law binds the member states to different extents,
however, in respect of each one of these two categories; often,
indeed, what is a right for family members of migrant European
citizens and contextually an obligation for the member states is a
mere possibility for the family members of TCNs, and contextually
an option for the member states.86
In the E.U., as in the U.S., the actual thickness of internal borders
in this field depends on the relative roles of European and of
domestic law in determining who qualifies as family member and
which unions are considered equivalent to marriage for purposes of
family reunification. European law includes definitions of family
members for purposes of family reunification, which leave some
flexibility to the member states in drawing the precise boundaries of
the relevant categories. In particular, concrete identification of the
kind of unions that qualify for purposes of family reunification is
often deferred to national legislation.
The two directives touching upon family reunification rights of
TCNs and Union citizens include a definition of family members;
under Directive 2003/86, “family members” are the TCN sponsor’s
spouse and minor children.87 Member states may, but are not
required to, authorize the entry and residence of a larger category of
family members at their discretion;88 in particular, they may decide to
extend these rights to unmarried partners in “duly attested stable
85. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (relating
to TCN family members of European citizens); Council Directive 2003/109, supra
note 81 (relating to TCN family members of TCNs).
86. Many of the prospective rights for family members of TCNs are expressed
in a way that allows member states to decide whether or not to pursue those rights
when enacting legislation. Member states may choose whether to impose entry
requirements specified in the directive, decide to refuse entry on grounds of public
health, public policy, or public security, and decide to extend the waiting period
imposed on the sponsoring TCN. See Council Directive 2003/86, supra note 3, art.
6; Adam Luedtke, The European Union Dimension: Supranational Integration,
Free Movement of Persons, and Immigration Politics, in IMMIGRATION AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE, supra note 7, at 419, 437 (suggesting that flexible
legislative language resulted from member states’ negotiations to avoid “hard legal
obligations” to TCNs).
87. Council Directive 2003/86, supra note 3, art. 4.
88. Id. art. 4.2 (allowing member states to authorize entry and residence of
first-degree relatives and adult unmarried children unable to provide for
themselves due to health).
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long-term relationship[s]” or in registered partnerships.89 A recital of
the directive adds that rights to family reunification “should be
exercised in proper compliance with the values and principles
recognized by the Member States”: protection of these values may
justify, for instance, restrictive measures against the family
reunifications of polygamous households.90
Directive 2004/38 squarely includes within the scope of the
definition of family members both spouses of an E.U. citizen and
registered partners based on the legislation of a member state, but
only if the host member state treats registered partnerships as
equivalent to marriage.91 Both instruments are thus deferential to the
autonomous choices of the member states.
As to the issue of same sex marriages, European law includes no
specific provision demanding that the member states recognize these
types of unions for purposes of immigration and residence rights.92
The two directives on family reunification only suggest, in their
preambles, that member states implement the directives without
discriminating among beneficiaries on the ground of sexual
orientation, among others.93
National legislation on same sex unions is still vastly
heterogeneous throughout Europe, where only four E.U. member
states recognize same sex marriages; other member states have
introduced civil unions or registered partnerships among same sex

89. Id. art. 4.3.
90. Id. pmbl. ¶ 11.
91. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 85, art. 2.2(b).
92. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 13, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 43 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty] (granting
the Community the competence to adopt legislation prohibiting discrimination on
various grounds, including sexual orientation, though the Community has not
exercised this competence in the immigration field); see Trybunal Konstytucyjny
[Polish Constitutional Tribunal], Poland's Membership in the European Union (The
Accession Treaty), No. K 18/04, Judgment, ¶ 30 (May 11, 2005), available at
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf
(interpreting EC Treaty Article 13’s prohibition of discrimination based on sexual
orientation as referring to individual persons and not the institution of marriage).
93. Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 85; Council
Directive 2003/86, supra note 3.
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partners, which confer some rights and benefits analogous to those of
marriage.94
The Court of Justice, pointing at this heterogeneity of positions
among the member states, has so far consistently denied the
equivalence of marriage and same sex unions.95 In the Grant case,
the Court made clear that “. . . in the present state of the law within
the Community, stable relationships between two persons of the
same sex are not regarded as equivalent to marriages or stable
relationships outside marriage between persons of opposite sex.”96
This position was reiterated in D. v Council, where, in upholding the
Council determination that a same sex partnership cannot be treated
as equivalent to marriage for purposes of a housing allowance
awarded to Community officers, the Court insisted that “[i]t is not in
question that, according to the definition generally accepted by the
Member States, the term ‘marriage’ means a union between two
persons of the opposite sex.”97 On the other hand, the Court
extensively has applied non-discrimination provisions on the basis of
sexual orientation to grant same sex partners benefits that are tied to
an employment relationship.98 That said, the Court has taken care to

94. See Sweden Allows Same-Sex Marriage, BBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7978495.stm (recognizing Sweden as the fourth E.U.
member state to legalize same sex marriage, after the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Spain). See generally Allison O’Neill, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the
European Community: The European Court of Justice’s Ability to Dictate Social
Policy, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 199, 200 (2004) (summarizing the legislation of
different member states recognizing different forms of same sex partnership).
95. See, e.g., Case C-249/96, Grant v. S.W. Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-621, ¶
35 (holding that the refusal of an employer to grant travel concessions to the same
sex spouse of an employee, when such travel concessions are granted to the
opposite sex spouse of an employee, does not constitute discrimination).
96. Id.
97. Joined Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D. v. Council of the European
Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, ¶¶ 34-37 (acknowledging that, since 1989, many
member states have introduced statutory arrangements recognizing various forms
of same sex unions, but underscoring that these arrangements vary greatly and are,
in any case, regarded as distinct from marriage).
98. See Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen,
2008 E.C.R. I-1757, ¶ 80 (citing Directive 2000/78 as precluding legislation that
denies a same sex partner a pension’s survivor’s benefits equivalent to those that a
spouse would receive).
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specify that it is for the member states to regulate civil unions and
descending benefits.99
Thus, the member states retain ample autonomy in regulating the
relevant issues. E.U. institutions have not ventured beyond nonbinding declarations and policy suggestions,100 while the last word as
to what does and does not qualify as marriage, and ultimately what
qualifies as family, stays with the member states.
This overview of relevant provisions suggests that European law
has influenced the status of immigrants in the European Union by
setting some common standards for their rights of residence and of
reunification with family members; in that respect, internal borders
are thinning in Europe. However, in other respects, such as in terms
of what qualifies as family, internal borders remain thick and well
marked in a manner comparable to the United States.
As mentioned above, determining just how relevant internal
borders are for the status of immigrants in the European Union
entails another consideration: other than through specific provisions
for the treatment of TCNs, does European law constrain member
states’ ability to discriminate between their own nationals and
TCNs? European provisions on equal treatment can provide an
answer in this sense. Article 12 of the E.C. Treaty prohibits
discrimination on the basis of nationality.101 A good part of the case
law applying this principle focuses, however, on situations involving
nationals of different member states, rather than nationals of third
countries.102 In addition, under the TCN legislation, long-term
residents benefit from a guarantee of treatment equal to nationals of
the member state where they reside.103 This non-discrimination right
99. Id. ¶ 59.
100. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 26 April 2007 on
Homophobia in Europe, 2008 O.J. (C74E) 776 (condemning hate speech against
homosexuals and reiterating the Parliament’s “request to the Commission to ensure
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in all sectors is prohibited”).
101. Consolidated EC Treaty art. 12.
102. See, e.g., Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil de l’ordre des avocats à la cour de
Paris, 1977 E.C.R. 765 (relating to the conditions for admittance to the legal
profession in Paris); see also Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, 1986 E.C.R.
195(regarding the right to travel to a member state as a recipient of services).
103. Council Directive 2003/109, supra note 81, art. 11 (encompassing within
equal treatment equal access to employment, education, social security, tax
benefits, and access to goods, services, and housing).
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becomes effective, however, only when the TCN has acquired longterm residence status.104 Pending qualification as long-term residents,
TCNs can, at most, benefit from the provisions of the race directive
and framework directive on equal treatment, which apply to “all
persons” within the scope of Community power.105 Considering the
kinds of discrimination that these instruments target and their fields
of application, they are likely to constrain the ability of member
states to extend to TCNs treatment less favorable than that to their
own nationals.106 Yet, both directives explicitly exclude from their
scope differences in treatment on the basis of nationality and, as a
result, what member states can manage to classify as a difference
based on nationality, rather than on race or ethnicity, should pass
muster under the directives.107
One of the first judicial applications of the race directive seems,
however, to bypass this textual limitation. In a 2008 case, a business
owner’s publicly rendered statement expressing his intention not to
hire immigrants because his customers would not want immigrant
workers in their houses was subject to scrutiny under the race
directive, and was found to conflict with the provisions of the
instrument.108 The statements at issue referred to immigrants but did
not include any explicit racial or ethnic connotation.109
Notwithstanding this, neither the Advocate General in the case, nor
the Court, considered the problem of the explicit exclusion of
discrimination on the basis of nationality from the scope of the
104. Id.
105. Council Directive 2000/43, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 (explicitly
extending the reach of the Directive’s equal treatment measures to “all persons, as
regards both the public and private sectors”); Council Directive 2000/78, art. 3,
2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (same).
106. See Council Directive 2000/43, supra note 105, art. 3 (aiming to implement
equal treatment, irrespective of racial and ethnic origin, to sets of rights connected
to the labor market); Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 105, arts. 1, 3
(targeting fields of discrimination similar to those covered in the race directive, but
instead focusing on discrimination on the basis of religion, belief, disability, age,
or sexual orientation).
107. Council Directive 2000/43, supra note 105, art. 3.2; Council Directive
2000/78, supra note 105, art. 3.2.
108. Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, 2008 E.C.R. I-5187, ¶ 28.
109. See id. ¶¶ 3-4, 18 (reporting that the refusal to hire did not refer to any
racially or ethnically distinct class).
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directive. The Court’s reading suggests a silent assumption that
discrimination against immigrants implies racial or ethnic
discrimination, even if immigrants are singled out at first sight only
for their nationality. If further case law confirms this expansive
reading of the race directive, it will become an important tool for
European law to constrain member states’ ability to treat immigrants
less favorably than their own citizens. Internal borders would, in this
case, further thin with respect to the treatment of immigrants. This is,
however, a conjecture that only future case law can confirm. For
now, non-discrimination legislation at the European level certainly
limits, to some extent, member states’ discretion in reserving benefits
and rights for their own nationals, and in singling out TCNs for
unfavorable treatment.110 In any event, such limitations do not reach
the breadth of the Graham v. Richardson doctrine in the United
States.111
The European Union has moved towards setting common
standards for the treatment of its immigrants. In doing so, it has
certainly induced a thinning impulse for regulatory internal borders.
However, the tying of benefits and opportunities to residence in a
single member state, the discretion that member states retain in
implementing family reunification provisions, and their ability to
treat TCNs less favorably than their own citizens preserve an
important role for internal regulatory borders. In light of all of this,
the best characterization of this aspect of internal borders with
respect to the treatment of immigrants in the European Union is,
perhaps, one that highlights their “optional thinning.”

110. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 21, 2007
O.J. (C 303) 1 (listing a more extensive and less constrained list of prohibited
grounds of discrimination, such as genetic features, language, and birth, which
might change this conclusion if the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
becomes binding law).
111. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (considering state-based
discrimination of aliens inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny in court);
see also text accompanying notes 49-54 (discussing the Graham decision, and
comparing it to case law on the discrimination of aliens by the federal government
in the United States).
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B. NATURALIZATION
Rules on naturalization identify, in the pool of admitted
immigrants, those eligible for full inclusion in the host community
through the achievement of citizenship. Also, these rules may be
mapped on different notions of internal borders, depending in large
part on the autonomy that the states retain in setting their own
requirements for, and in making their own decisions about, inclusion
and exclusion. Setting the requirements for naturalization and
deciding on the grant or denial of citizenship may be seen as
important ways for individual states to express their distinctiveness,
bound their community, and safeguard their own identity.
1. Naturalization in the United States
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution indicates that
aliens are naturalized into federal citizenship and, as a consequence,
also obtain the citizenship of the state in which they reside.112 Rules
on nationality and naturalization are decided upon at the federal
level.113 In the aftermath of the American Revolution, each state was
free to set forth its own criteria according to which their residents,
previously classified as British subjects, could re-qualify as citizens
of the new independent polities.114 While for the entire first century
of constitutional history of the United States the individual states
maintained an admission power,115 they rapidly lost the naturalization
power to the federal government: the Constitution of the United
States, in fact, grants Congress the power to establish a uniform rule
of naturalization.116 In the years immediately following the adoption
of the Constitution, Congress began to exercise its immigration
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside.”). U.S. citizens who are not resident in
a U.S. state lose their state citizenship, meaning they are only U.S. citizens.
Among the concrete results of this is that they cannot sue in federal courts on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction, but rather must rely on state courts. CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3621 (3d ed. 1998).
113. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
114. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608-1870 213-16 (1978) (suggesting that, for states, an individual’s participation
in the cause of the Revolution generally proved allegiance to republican ideals).
115. See Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103.
116. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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power by adopting several subsequent naturalization acts, and,
between 1790 and 1952, extended or reduced the required residence
period to qualify for naturalization and enacted more or less stringent
requirements in line with the political moods of the time.117 While the
states lost the power to legally include, they retained a voice in
determining the rights of naturalized citizens; as a result, rights could
potentially differ from state to state, depending on the relative weight
of state and federal citizenship in the early United States.118 With
federal citizenship gradually overshadowing state citizenship,
remnants of state power in this field were rapidly lost, and internal
regulatory borders with respect to naturalization have been thin ever
since.
Under current rules, legal permanent residents are entitled to
naturalize after five years of continuous residence in the United
States,119 or three years for spouses of U.S. citizens.120 All applicants
for naturalization must be at least eighteen years of age and they

117. The first Naturalization Act was passed in 1790, see supra note 115, and
required a minimum residence of two years in the United States in order to qualify
for naturalization. This requirement was increased to five years with a 1795 act.
Significantly harsher rules were introduced with the Alien Act of 1798, passed by
the Federalist government, which increased the minimum required period of
residence for naturalization to fourteen years. The Republican Party eventually
passed another act in 1801, bringing the threshold residence for naturalization back
to five years. See generally Bernard, supra note 31 (summarizing the history of
Congress’ exercise of its immigration power).
118. The relative weight of federal and state citizenship has changed
significantly since the eighteenth century. Neither the Articles of Confederation,
nor the Constitution of 1787, contemplated a definition of national citizenship, and
state citizenship was initially the most important legal status. The twist in the
relationship between state citizenship and U.S. citizenship came with the Civil
War. In the decades leading up to the war, the idea that federal citizenship ensued
from state citizenship created tensions and difficulties, especially in the Southern
states, which would not accept the practice of non-slave states’ admission of free
black men to state citizenship. The post-war constitutional amendments brought
about the express prohibition of slavery and the codification of the relationship
between state and federal citizenship. See Reed Ueda, Naturalization and
Citizenship, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 734, 738
(Stephan Thernstrom et al. eds., 1980) (recounting the issues of federalism
presented by the citizenship debate in the lead-up to and aftermath of the Civil
War); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing for both federal and state
citizenship).
119. INA § 316(a).
120. Id. § 319(a).
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must demonstrate proficiency in reading, writing, and speaking the
English language.121 They must prove that they have some
knowledge of U.S. history and civics,122 and they must be of good
moral character.123 Prospective citizens must show, in particular, that
they are “attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States, and well disposed to the good order and the happiness of the
United States.”124 These constitutional principles have been found to
include, among others, the protection of life, liberty, property, the
principle of representative government, and hostility to dictatorship
and minority rule.125
More generally, this requirement implies an understanding of the
process of law-making in the country and a disposition to abide by
the laws that are so enacted, together with the understanding and
acceptance of the means of change that the Constitution prescribes
and allows.126
In addition to the aforementioned requirements, prospective
citizens must swear allegiance to the United States according to an
oath, in which they undertake to submit themselves to the U.S.
Constitution and to renounce any previous allegiance to a foreign
121. Id. §§ 312(a)(1), 334(b); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 52, §
95.03[4](b) (clarifying that exceptions are granted to persons over fifty years of
age and lawfully admitted for permanent residence for periods totaling twenty
years, or to persons over fifty-five years of age and having lived in the United
States in legal permanent residence status for over fifteen years).
122. INA § 312(a)(2); see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 66 (providing a
set of sample questions for the required oral exam, which include “Who elects the
President of the United States?” and “What is the Bill of Rights?”).
123. INA § 316(a); see GORDON ET AL., supra note 52, § 95.04[1](a) (noting that
moral character is dependent on fluctuating social norms, but should still be
assessed in relation to the “moral standards of the average person”).
124. INA § 316(a).
125. Stasiukevich v. Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474, 478 (1st Cir. 1948) (quoting
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 181 (1943) (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting)).
126. Disobedience of the laws in itself, however, has not been found sufficient
to show a disposition contrary to the good order of the United States. See YinShing Woo v. United States, 288 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that
repeated disobedience to parking laws did not sufficiently show a disposition
contrary to the ‘good order’ of the United States); see GORDON ET AL., supra note
52, § 95.04.2.b (discussing controversial, and subsequently overruled, Supreme
Court decisions holding that an immigrant unwilling to take up arms to defend the
United States could not be “attached and favorably disposed to this country”).
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government.127 While this does not necessarily imply rescission of all
emotional or rational ties to cultural and political origins that the
applicant is leaving behind, this profession of allegiance entails
embracing an ideal of life that is shared among the several united
states. Gaetano Salvemini, an Italian politician and anti-fascist,
effectively captures the intent of the oath in a description of his own
experience of naturalization in the United States:
When I took my oath I felt that really I was performing a
grand function. I was throwing away not my intellectual and
moral but my juristic past. I threw it away without any regret.
The Ethiopian war, the rape of Albania, the Spanish crime,
and this last idiotic crime, had really broken my connection
with sovereigns, potentates, and all those ugly things which
are enumerated in the formula of the oath. It is a wonderful
formula. Your pledges are only juridical and political. You
are asked to sever your connections with the government of
your former country, not with the people and the civilization
of your former country. And you are asked to give allegiance
to the Constitution of your adopted country, that is, to an
ideal of life.128
The prospective citizen in the U.S. is thus asked to commit to the
common values of the country, to the Constitution and to a shared set
of ideals. Acquaintance and familiarity with the community of a
specific state have little role here, and this points to the thin character
of internal definitional borders. Thus, when it comes to naturalization
of immigrants, internal borders in the United States are transparent,
both in their regulatory and definitional value.
2. Naturalization in the European Union
Under the definition of European citizenship, found in article 17 of
the E.C. Treaty, everyone who is a national of a member state of the
European Union shall be a European citizen.129 Access to European
citizenship is thus mediated by the acquisition of nationality of a
member state.

127. INA § 337(a); see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 37, at 80 (providing the
current version of the oath).
128. Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 675 (internal citation omitted).
129. Consolidated EC Treaty art. 17, §1.
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Each member state sets forth its own naturalization rules, which
tend to be widely different in the quality and quantity of
requirements.130 First, every member state requires that an applicant
for naturalization has resided legally on the territory of that member
state for a certain number of years. The length of the residency
requirement varies from state to state, from a minimum of three to a
maximum of ten years.131 While in some member states double
nationality raises no issues, in others the acquisition of citizenship is
conditional upon renunciation, release, or loss of any previous
citizenship.132 Wealth is also a requirement for naturalization in some
cases: some member states demand that prospective citizens have
sufficient and stable resources to maintain themselves and possibly
their families.133 Children of immigrants born on the territory of a
member state also face widely different options with respect to the
achievement of citizenship; some naturalization statutes allow for
children of immigrants to acquire nationality at birth if at least one
130. See Francesca Strumia, European Citizenship: Mobile Nationals, Immobile
Aliens, and Random Europeans, in CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA AND EUROPE:
BEYOND THE NATION-STATE? 45, 54 (Michael S. Greve & Michael Zöller eds.
2009) (analyzing various requirements for naturalization in different member
states, such as length of residency or multiple nationalities).
131. See Code de la Nationalité Belge [Code of Belgian Nationality] § 5, art. 19
(2006), available at http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_F.pl?cn=1984062835
(requiring three years of residence on a non- temporary residence permit); Irish
Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, art. 15(1)(c) (Act No. 26/1956) (Ir.),
available at http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/consolidationINCA.pdf/Files/consolid
ationINCA.pdf (requiring a residence period of one continuous year immediately
before the date of the application, but a total of four years); Law n. 91/1992, Nuove
Norme sulla Cittadinanza art. 9(f), Feb. 5, 1992, Gazz. Uff. No.38, Feb. 15, 1992
(Italy), available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/
servizi/legislazione/cittadinanza/legislazione_30.html (indicating a ten-year
residence requirement).
132. See, e.g., Consolidated Act on Danish Nationality §§ 4(A)1, 7, No.
422/2004 (Den.), available at http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/52136BD
4-FA62-4818-AABB-5709AABAC6A6/0/consolidation_act_no_422_7_june_20
04.pdf (requiring proof of the loss of existing nationalities as a condition to
acquiring Danish nationality).
133. See Bundesgesetz über die Österreichische Staatsbürgerschaft of 1985
[Staatsbürgerschaftgesetz StbG] [Law on Austrian Citizenship], BGBl. No.
311/1985, as amended 2008, BGBl. I 4/2008 and BGBl. I 104/2008 ) § 10, ¶ 1 (7),
available at http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Staatsbuergerschaft/Staatsbuergersch
aftsgesetz_1985.doc (requiring availability of means of support for naturalization);
see also Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz as amended by Law of Feb. 5, 2009, BGbl. I,
at 158, art. 1 § 10 (1) 3 (same).
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parent has previously resided in the state of birth.134 Others allow
children born on the territory of the state to naturalize even
independently of their parents once they reach majority.135 Even after
naturalization, the constraints immigrants face in the European
Union are different depending on where they obtained the national
citizenship that, in turn, grants them automatic European citizenship.
If they naturalized in Malta or in Cyprus, for instance, they face the
risk of losing their national citizenship by virtue of the rules
attendant to that naturalization. For example, if they remained absent
from the Maltese or Cypriot territory for periods of seven years or
longer without a positive statement of the intent to remain citizens,
they would lose their national citizenship, and indeed such
immigrants would risk losing also their European citizenship.136 As
such, internal regulatory borders remain thick: European citizenship
is singular, but the ways toward acquiring it are several and
disparate. The opportunities for an immigrant to obtain European
citizenship through the achievement of a member state citizenship
will vary widely depending on where he first landed and where his
admission documents allow him to plan his European life.
Acquisition of citizenship marks not only a change in legal status,
but also the admission into a political and affective community that
claims a right to self-definition. This is why many naturalization
laws also include integration requirements, which target an
applicant’s familiarity with cultural, linguistic, and constitutional
features of the receiving polity:137 the content and scope of these
requirements in European naturalization laws may illustrate whether
the member states of Europe consider themselves branches of a
134. Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, art. 6(a).
135. See Nouve Norme sulla Cittadinanza art. 4(2) (allowing children who have
resided in Italy continuously since birth to naturalize independently of their parents
upon reaching majority).
136. Republic of Cyprus Citizenship Law 1967 art. 8(4), (Act No. 43 of 1967 as
amended 1999), translation available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal
_co-operation/foreigners_and_citizens/nationality/documents/national_legislation/
Cyprus-The%20Republic%20of%20Cyprus%20Citizenship%20Law%201967.pdf;
Maltese Citizenship Act art. 14(2)(d) (Act XXX/1965 as amended 2007), available
at http://docs.justice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol_4/chapt188.pdf.
137. See, e.g., Code Civil (C.CIV.) art. 21-24 (Fr.), translation available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm (requiring
proof of language competence and assimilation into the community before
naturalization).
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common European polity, or rather as distinct and independent
polities. In other words, the focus of integration requirements
provides a hint of the extension of the idea that each member state
harbors of itself; where the integration requirements no longer lay
claims on potential citizens, the definitional borders of the polity
have been passed.
Three kinds of integration requirements may be distinguished in
European naturalization laws: 1) language requirements; 2)
requirements of knowledge of history, culture, and the laws of a
polity; and 3) requirements to render a solemn declaration of
allegiance. Of the three kinds of integration requirements, the
definitional value of language can, perhaps, be more easily reduced
to a matter of pragmatism: in most skill cases, familiarity with the
local language is a prerequisite for an applicant to properly function
in his future society of belonging, to receive an education, to work in
the host society, and to interact with its members. On the other hand,
language is also the gate to the culture, literature, collective memory,
and, more generally, the collective heritage of the host polity. The
prospective European faces not one language, but twenty-four, and
not one culture, but twenty-seven. The fragmentation of his inclusion
experience begins here, where he is called upon to prove that there is
one society in the European Union whose language he speaks and
whose literature he can read.
Some member states also require that applicant citizens show
knowledge of the history, the culture, and/or the Constitution and
relevant laws of their country.138 Rarely, if ever, do requirements of
this kind include a reference to Europe. One such reference can be
found in Austrian legislation, which provides that the evaluation of a
foreigner’s integration into Austria entails considering his attitude
towards the “fundamental values of a European democratic state and
its society.”139
138. See
id.
(requiring
proof
of
assimilation);
see
also
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG) [Citizenship Law], Jul. 22, 1913, BGBl. III
102-1, as amended by Law of Feb. 5, 2009, BGBl. I, at 158, art. 1, § 10(1)7,
available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/rustag/BJNR005830913.html (requiring a
familiarity with the laws of Germany).
139. See Bundesgesetz über die Österreichische Staatsbürgerschaft of 1985
[Staatsbürgerschaftgesetz StbG] [Law on Austrian Citizenship], BGBl. No.
311/1985, as amended 2008, BGBl. I 4/2008 and BGBl. I 104/2008 ) § 11,
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Many naturalizing immigrants are also required to render
declarations of allegiance. The text of many of these oaths
emphasizes requirements of loyalty to the naturalizing state and
commitment to protect its interest.140 For instance, the prospective
Lithuanian has to swear, “‘to be loyal to the Republic of Lithuania, to
observe the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Lithuania, to
defend the independence of the State of Lithuania, the territorial
integrity of the state and the constitutional order.’”141 He also swears
to “‘respect the state language of Lithuania, its culture and customs,
to strengthen the basic principles of democracy and the rule of law in
Lithuania.’”142 Not far away, in Latvia, a citizen-to-be would rather
say:
I . . . , pledge that I will be loyal only to the Republic of
Latvia. I undertake to fulfil the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of Latvia in good faith and with all vigour to protect
them. I undertake, without regard to my life, to defend the
independence of the State of Latvia and to live and work in
good faith, in order to increase the prosperity of the State of
Latvia
and
of
the
people.143
A prospective Hungarian would instead pronounce the following
words:
I . . . , do solemnly swear that I shall consider Hungary my
country. I shall be a loyal citizen of the Republic of Hungary,
shall honor and observe the Constitution and laws thereof. I

available at http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Staatsbuergerschaft/Staatsbuergersc
haftsgesetz_1985.doc.
140. See Strumia, supra note 130, at 55-56 (analyzing the national dimension’s
centrality to the process of naturalization of an immigrant in the European Union
and arguing that oaths of allegiance underline this aspect of the naturalization
process).
141. Istatymas [Law on Citizenship], art. 15(2), Sept. 17, 2002, Act No. IX1078, last amended March 19, 2009, Act XI-205), Valstybės žinios, 2002-10-02,
Nr. 95-4087 (Lith.), translation available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardse
tting/nationality/National%20legislation/Lithuania-Law%20on%20Citizenship%20
2003.pdf (official translation).
142. Id.
143. Pilsonības likums 1994 § 18 [Citizenship Law], Aug. 25, 1994, as amended
1998 (Lat.), translation available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
ocuments/untc/unpan018407.pdf.
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shall defend my country as far as my strength allows, and
shall serve it according to the best of my abilities.144
It is true that many of these words represent symbolic and
celebratory value rather than the concrete undertaking of a task. Yet,
no prospective European citizen is required to swear allegiance to the
European Union and to its interest, which might even conflict with
the interest of a single state. It is probably difficult for the immigrant,
who declares his allegiance in these words and thereby becomes a
national of Lithuania, Latvia, or Hungary, respectively, to remember
that he is also becoming a citizen of Europe.
Integration requirements may be seen as an indication of where the
idea of the European polity exhausts itself. And this tends to happen,
in the European Union, at the frontier of each member state. As a
result, those TCNs that European law addresses as a homogeneous
group are facing not one, but several, disparate experiences in
pursuing inclusion in the multi-tier European polity. The divergence
in naturalization laws among the member states signals that internal
regulatory borders, with respect to inclusion, are thick. And similarly
thick are the definitional internal borders throughout the European
Union.

TABLE 2 THE MAP OF INTERNAL BORDERS
IMMIGRATION
ADMISSION TREATMENT
OF

IMMIGRANTS
UNITED
STATES

Thin

Thin with
thick spots

NATURALIZATION
INCLUSION

INCLUSION

(REGULATORY (DEFINITIONAL
BORDERS)
BORDERS)
Thin

EUROPEAN Thinning by Thinning by Thick
UNION
category
option

Thin

Thick

144. Act on Hungarian Citizenship § 7(4), Act LV of 1993, Jun. 1, 1993,
translation available at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/63EF366D-8DD1446D-B513-7B3EF006C865/0/078Hungariancitizenship.pdf.
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III. DISTINCTIVENESS AND INCLUSION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. UNITED STATES INCLUSION AND EUROPEAN UNION
DISTINCTIVENESS
With respect to the rules of admission, treatment of immigrants,
and naturalization process, the map of internal borders reveals
perimeters of different levels of thickness in the United States and in
the European Union. Internal borders are generally thin in the United
States, as compared to the generally thick borders of the European
Union, even if those borders are gradually thinning for certain
purposes.
The rules of admission and the treatment of immigrants overlap
more than do the rules of citizenship and naturalization. Indeed, U.S.
internal borders are thin with respect to both admission and the
treatment of immigrants; however, intermittent thick spots do exist.
For instance, in the United States, state family law and federal
immigration law cooperate in determining the family reunification
rights of immigrants. On the other hand, the same kinds of borders
remain thick in the European Union. Increasing regulation at the
E.U. level yields a thinning impulse throughout the system so that
the status of TCNs becomes gradually more homogeneous and the
divisive effect of internal borders more tenuous. In the field of access
to citizenship and naturalization, the contrast between the United
States and the European Union is remarkable: thin borders in the
United States, where the route to federal citizenship is singular,
regardless of state residence, contrasted with extremely thick borders
in the European Union, where naturalization happens according to
the terms of multiple diverging regimes of law that impose
requirements differing in quantity and quality.
This map of internal borders suggests, at first sight, that the United
States and the European Union have different priorities with respect
to accommodating the competing interests of states in distinctiveness
and immigrants in inclusion. The United States seems inclined to
give immigrants a wide spectrum of inclusion, while sacrificing
states’ interests in distinctiveness. The European Union, on the
contrary, appears strongly committed to its member states’ interest in
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distinctiveness, even if this entails a fragmentation of an immigrant’s
inclusion experience.
Thin borders in the United States guarantee immigrants an ample
spectrum of inclusion in the phase of admission, while they live as
foreigners in the country, and, eventually, when they qualify and
apply for U.S. citizenship. In all these phases, their immigration
status and the associated rights are similar in each one of the fifty
states. Immigrants can move from one state to another without facing
barriers and without sacrificing any residence time that qualifies
them for naturalization; their condition is homogeneous and provides
a clear mirror image of the condition of citizens. On the other hand,
the states can hardly use immigration policy and alien/citizen
distinctions as a way to protect their own spheres of autonomy and
their distinct identities. They do remain free to treat immigrants on
particularly favorable terms by enacting autonomous integration
programs, and they retain a marginal power to use family law
categories to limit, to some extent, immigration rights. The states’
powers to select their own citizens are, however, reduced to a
minimum; consequently, states’ expressions of distinctiveness must
seek other avenues.
Thick borders in the European Union protect, instead, a sphere of
distinctiveness for the member states. While coping with some
intrusions on the part of the European Union, member states are still
able to admit, exclude, and, to some extent, choose the immigrants
that they are willing to let in; though some visas are common, annual
quotas for admission are decided on a state by state basis.145
European law dictates some rules in terms of how states must treat
immigrants that they have let in, but in many areas, member states
may still distinguish and preserve some room to discriminate
between their own nationals and TCNs. Finally, and most
importantly, the member states administer the undisturbed power to
grant citizenship. In other words, the member states retain many
different tools to affirm their distinctiveness by deciding who is an
“insider” and who is an “outsider” within their borders. Bounding
and excluding on the part of the member states results in a
fragmentation of the inclusion experience of immigrants. The
145. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 79(5), 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 78.
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condition of an immigrant depends on the corner of the Union in
which he finds himself, which in turn affects the kind of residence
permit that he may rely on, the rights he enjoys, and the family he
can bring. Of course, it will also affect how long he has to wait and
which requirements he must meet to become a European citizen.
Immigrants, in principle, cannot move from one member state to
another; if not for short stays that might be allowed depending on the
kind of visa that they obtain, they have no right to relocate to a
second member state. Even if they find an opportunity to work in a
member state other than the one they first accessed, in order to take
advantage of such opportunity, they would need to comply with the
admission rules of the second country—they would have to
immigrate once again.146 Long-term resident immigrants have some
limited rights to move among the member states,147 but considering
how thick internal borders are for naturalization purposes, even the
exercise of this right comes at a high cost. In moving, they would
lose the time they might have accrued that would count toward the
naturalization qualification of a certain member state. The
immigrants would then have to start the accrual of time all over again
in the new host member state. Thus, the rules of admission, treatment
of immigrants, and naturalization processes in the European Union
protect the distinctiveness of the member states, but restrict the scope
of inclusion of immigrants to the territory of each single member
state. In doing so, they also create additional divisions between
citizens and immigrants by providing for mobility to the former, and
immobility to the latter, within the internal borders of the European
Union.148
At first sight, the United States and the European Union, despite
valuing both the distinctiveness of individual states and the inclusion
146. As an exception, TCNs admitted for highly qualified employment are able
to move to a second member state after eighteen months of legal residence in the
first member state. Council Directive 2009/50, supra note 3.
147. See Council Directive 2003/109, supra note 81 (allowing residence in a
second member state for the “exercise of an economic activity in an employed or
self-employed capacity,” “pursuit of studies or vocational training,” or “other
purposes”).
148. See Strumia, supra note 130, at 48-52 (describing a “hierarchy of mobility”
in the European Union dependent upon the both a person’s citizenship status, as
well as the amount of time spent within the European Union and/or a given
member state).
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of immigrants, seem to allocate their priorities differently and pursue
different goals with respect to the balance of these competing sets of
interests.

B. AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE: THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL
DISTINCTIVENESS
Adding a variable to this story, though, might alter the scenario
that the map of internal borders suggests. The United States and the
European Union, through the allocation of the power to admit, treat,
and naturalize immigrants between the center and the periphery, may
actually be seen as pursuing the same goal: national distinctiveness.
Anthony Smith’s definition of a nation refers to “a named human
population sharing a historical territory, common memories and
myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common
economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties
for all members of the collectivity.”149 The community for which a
definition of this kind resonates is different in the United States as
compared to the European Union. The United States is a nation and
shares, at large, many of the elements to which Smith refers, while
the European Union is a collection of national states that have pooled
part of their sovereignties, but remain individually bound within
diverse cultural and civic perimeters. Some of Smith’s elements of a
nation arguably have found room at the European level, but Smith’s
words resonate strongest at the level of the member states.
National communities jealously guard themselves and protect their
civic and cultural features.150 Decisions on national inclusion and
149. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity and the Idea of European Unity, 68
INT’L AFF. 55, 60 & n.9 (1992) (drawing upon earlier definitions proffered by Karl
Deutsch and Walker Conner which encompassed other categories such as ethnic
groups).
150. Cf. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN
POLITICAL THEORY 106-14 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998) (noting
that the national idea weaves a narrative of commonality, which justifies the
existence of the political community and its self determination). The nation has
also been described as an “imagined community.” See BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF
NATIONALISM 22, 113-40 (rev. 2d ed. 1991) (describing the nation as an “imagined
community,” in which the spread of new communication technologies, such as the
press, coincides with a maturation of the conception of time, and through which it
is conceivable that several people exist and are engaged simultaneously in different
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exclusion represent, for them, a fundamental opportunity to express
their distinctiveness and to accurately select the pool of their
members so that any entrance from outside does not dilute the
cohesiveness of the nation or alter the civic and cultural premises of
its identity. Thus, the national community has a strong interest in
distinctiveness, which it may pursue, in part, through the articulation
of the rules on admission, treatment of immigrants, and
naturalization processes.
In a multi-tier polity, interests in national distinctiveness may alter
the relative weight of immigrants’ interests in inclusion and states’
interests in distinctiveness. In the cases of the United States and the
European Union, national distinctiveness diverges with respect to the
rules of admission, treatment of immigrants, and naturalization
processes. In the United States, by pushing for federal rule in
immigration matters, national distinctiveness overshadows the
interest of individual states to have their own identities. By contrast,
national distinctiveness in the European Union amplifies the interest
of member states in distinctiveness, resulting in a stronger resistance
to pooling their sovereignties for purposes of creating a common
immigration policy.
A sign that the states’ interest in distinctiveness pales in
comparison to national concerns may be found in U.S. cases that
have confirmed and consolidated the exclusivity of federal rule in the
immigration sphere: “For local interests the several states of the
Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”151
With these words, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of an
amended treaty with China, under whose terms a Chinese laborer
who temporarily left the United States after a lawful residence was
deemed deportable and held in detention upon return, even if he had

enterprises).
151. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); see also
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 12 (identifying a judicial inclination at the turn of the
twentieth century in favor of reinforcing the power of the federal government by
acknowledging its authority to act in all capacities requisite to operate as a world
power).
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in his possession a certificate entitling him to return.152 The justices
emphasized that:
While under our constitution and form of government the
great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities,
the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and
their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with
powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute
independence and security throughout its entire territory.153
Including and excluding aliens by ruling on their admission,
treatment, and naturalization is seen here as one of the ways in which
the American nation affirms its distinctiveness vis-à-vis foreign
nations.154 Keeping the nation safe and guarding its borders justifies
the silencing of the states in immigration matters;155 national
distinctiveness, in other words, overrides state distinctiveness.
By contrast, several passages in the legal texts that gradually
elaborate on a common immigration policy in the European Union
evidence how concerns for national autonomy amplify the interest in
member states’ distinctiveness and lead member states to express
reservations while pooling their sovereignties. The Declaration on
Nationality attached to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, along with
the simultaneous introduction of European citizenship, are the first
signs of the member states’ attempts to defend their bounded national
communities.156 They alone would retain the power to decide who is
152. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582 (explaining that the appellant was
detained onboard the ship on which he arrived).
153. Id. at 604. Justice Field further cautioned that the United States must secure
itself against aggression, the source of which could be an overt act by a foreign
nation or “from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us”. Id. at 606.
154. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 13-14 (recognizing that sovereignty, in
addition to the simple ability to control one’s borders, also means the ability to
“construct an ‘American People’ through the adoption of membership rules”).
155. See id. (identifying in the Chinese Exclusion Case the expression of a
“double sense of danger,” the threat that immigration poses to both U.S. territorial
integrity and the composition of its population).
156. See Treaty on European Union: Declaration on Nationality of a Member
State, 1992 O.J. (C 191) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992
M/htm/11992M.html#0098000022 (“The Conference declares that, wherever in
the Treaty establishing the European Community reference is made to nationals of
the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses the nationality of
a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the
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a national for community purposes. European institutions, on the
other hand, seem reluctant to interfere with the member states’
discretion to draw the boundaries of their national sphere. Even the
European Court of Justice, ever-ready to investigate the many areas
of the member states’ competence to benefit the Union, has been
very deferential in matters of nationality. For instance, the Court has
held that a member state can extend the right to be active electors for
the European Parliament to people who are not technically nationals,
but who are nonetheless European citizens and have, in any case, a
close link to the nation.157 On the other hand, European judges have
also found that a member state can legitimately exclude a person
who is a national and European citizen residing overseas from voting
for the European Parliament.158 The new Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, though extending the European Union’s
immigration competence, explicitly excludes any harmonization of
the relevant laws of the member states;159 nobody doubts that the
member states are to retain a measure of autonomy in adopting
regulations that pertain to inclusion and exclusion of the national
community.
The overlap between the sphere of the nation and the sphere of the
member states demonstrates, in the European Union, the states’
interest in distinctiveness. The endeavor to develop and consolidate a
common immigration policy stops short of affecting independently
drawn national boundaries. Maintaining some extent of control over
the admission, treatment of immigrants, and naturalization process is
a fundamental way for the member states of the European Union to
protect twenty-seven distinct national identities.
Thus, the United States and the European Union seem to give,
through their regimes of admission, treatment of immigrants, and
naturalization process, different levels of significance to the interests
of individual states in distinctiveness. It is the shift in significance
Member State concerned.”).
157. See Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 2006 E.C.R. I-7917, ¶¶ 9193 (affirming the right of the United Kingdom to extend the vote to citizens of
Gibraltar, a British territory).
158. CASE C-300/04, EMAN V. COLLEGE VAN BURGEMEESTER EN WETHOUDERS
VAN DEN HAAG, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 72.
159. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 79(4)-(5).
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between the United States and the European Union with respect to
national distinctiveness that alters the relative weight of these
interests. A different role of the center and the periphery in
immigration matters and a different attention to states’ interests in
distinctiveness mask what is, in fact, an analogous commitment:
protecting well-bounded national communities, making sure that
acceding outsiders do not dilute their cohesiveness, and ensuring
continuity in their cultural and civic identities.

C. THE REAL DIFFERENCE: IMMIGRANTS’ INTERESTS IN INCLUSION
Considerations of national distinctiveness help to reconcile what
appeared at first a stark contrast in goals between the United States
and the European Union’s rules on immigration. In light of this
enlarged scenario, immigrants’ interest in inclusion still seems to fare
in profoundly different ways on opposite sides of the Atlantic. For
immigrants entering the United States, the process of inclusion is
nationwide and includes all fifty states. As suggested above, on the
other hand, immigrants entering the European Union face widely
different destinies depending on the specific member state they are
entering.
In the United States, the national interest in distinctiveness blends
with immigrants’ interest in being included into the several states and
living in circumstances similar to those of citizens: both entail the
federal power to handle immigration. Indeed, federal rule has
resulted in admission visas that are valid for the entire national
territory, leaving immigrants free, from a legal point of view, to
relocate among the several states. Uniform naturalization rules
ensure that immigrants exercise their right to travel in a way
comparable to citizens without any negative consequences to their
qualifications for American citizenship; equal protection doctrines
protect immigrants from any attempt on the part of individual states
to put them at a disadvantage with respect to state citizens.
This situation descends from the organization of the rules of
admission, treatment of immigrants, and inclusion of immigrants.
U.S. courts have sometimes justified the distribution of power
between the center and the periphery as guaranteeing effective
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decisions on exclusion and national security,160 rather than in
ensuring fair treatment of immigrants.
In Henderson v. Mayor of New York City,161 a case which is
considered finally to strip the states of their powers in immigration
matters,162 the Supreme Court struck down as a violation of the
commerce clause a New York statute which required any shipmaster
to submit a report and pay a bond to the state for each passenger
coming in from a foreign country.163 The Court underlined the need
for uniformity in these kinds of regulations:
It is equally clear that the matter of these statutes may be, and
ought to be, the subject of a uniform system or plan. The laws
which govern the right to land passengers in the United States
from other countries ought to be the same in New York,
Boston, New Orleans, and San Francisco.164
While the Court, in this case, did not explicitly link the need for
uniformity of rule with the desire to defend the community against
intrusion from the outside, a few years later in the Chinese Exclusion
Case,165 it emphasized a similar justification for the federal exercise
of immigration powers:
That the government of the United States, through the action
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its
territory is a proposition which we do not think open to
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its
independence.166
And further:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of
160. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 12-13 (noting that Justice Field
considered the preservation of the nation’s independence to be its highest duty).
161. 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
162. Cf. Neuman, supra note 31, at 1833-35 (1993) (recognizing 1875 as a
watershed moment in the history of American immigration law).
163. See Henderson, 92 U.S. at 271 (characterizing the transport of passengers
from Liverpool to New York as a commercial interaction with a foreign nation).
164. Id. at 273.
165. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
166. Id. at 603.
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a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with
us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion
is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual
hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are
subjects.167
Here, in the context of confirming the exclusivity of federal power
in the immigration field, the Court seemed to ignore the interests of
immigrants in treatment comparable to citizens, as well as their
interest in inclusion beyond the boundaries of a single state.
Some subsequent cases adjudicating the rules on immigration and
the treatment of aliens began, however, to justify the exclusivity of
the federal power in the immigration field with the need to ensure a
welcoming environment for aliens, where their conditions of
inclusion are homogeneous throughout the several states. In the
previously mentioned case of Truax v. Raich, the Supreme Court
seemed preoccupied with the inclusion of aliens: it stresses that only
the federal government has the authority to control immigration, and
individual states cannot deny to aliens the means of earning their
livelihoods, resulting in the denial of the right to an abode.168 The
justices were worried that a policy of this kind would result in the de
facto segregation of aliens in the few states willing to host them.169
This would be contrary to immigrants’ interest in inclusion in the
several states.
Some years later, the Court invalidated a California statute barring
the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for
U.S. citizenship.170 Once again, the justices emphasized that states
cannot interfere with the power of the federal government to include:
[States] can neither add to nor take from the conditions
lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization
and residence of aliens in the United States or the several
states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon
167. Id. at 606; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 28-29 (comparing the
exclusivist tone of this case with cases concerning the status of the territories of the
United States and their inhabitants, and finding that they project similar notions of
Anglo-Saxon superiority and “civilization”).
168. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (recognizing that, typically, one
cannot live where one cannot work).
169. Id.
170. Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United
States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal
power to regulate immigration . . . .171
Following this path in Graham vs. Richardson, a more recently
decided case, the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of
review to state-based discrimination based on alienage:172 aliens were
found to be, indeed, the epitome of a “discrete and insular
minority.”173 Still, in Graham, the Court seemed preoccupied with
ensuring that the condition of aliens residing in the United States
resembles that of citizens: aliens lawfully present “have a right to
enter and abide in any state in the Union ‘on an equality of legal
privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws.’”174
Immigrants’ interests in benefiting from inclusion in the several
states and in living in the United States in a condition akin to that of
citizens were probably not the basis for the 19th century impetus for
federal rule in the immigration field. Subsequently, however,
interests of this kind found de facto accommodation in the structure
of the rules on admission, treatment of immigrants, and
naturalization process. Gradually, these interests also found room in
judicial discourse as an additional justification for the exclusivity of
federal power in the immigration field. While in potential contrast
with the states’ interests in distinctiveness, the recognition of
immigrants’ interest in inclusion simultaneously pushed the United
States in the direction of preserving national distinctiveness:
inclusion interests found protection through federal immigration
rules, thus limiting the ability of the states to draw autonomous
boundaries and discriminate between immigrants and citizens. This
harmony of interests has eased its way into immigration rules that
expand the rights of immigrants to the entire nation rather than
restricting those rights to individual states.
The balance of immigrants’ interest in supranational inclusion is
quite different in the European Union. There, the process of
integration and the introduction of notions of citizenship and
membership beyond the nation has led to the ripening of immigrants’
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 419.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Id. at 372.
Id. at 377-78 (citing Torao Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420).
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interest in inclusion beyond the national level: being European and
fully benefiting from the European way of life means being
acknowledged as economic participants in the Europe-wide legal
community in a way parallel to European citizens. This was already
clear to policy makers at the time of the Tampere European Council.
In the Conclusions of the Presidency it is highlighted that:
The European Union has already put in place for its citizens
the major ingredients of a shared area of prosperity and
peace . . . . The challenge of the Amsterdam Treaty is now to
ensure that freedom, which includes the right to move freely
throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of
security and justice accessible to all. . . . This freedom should
not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the
Union’s own citizens. Its very existence acts as a draw to
many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom
Union citizens take for granted. It would be in contradiction
with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose
circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our
territory.175
Supranational inclusion, in this sense, would entail the enjoyment
of a right of free movement among the member states, the absence of
negative consequences in access to citizenship by the fact of having
exercised these free movement rights, and the ability to cumulate
periods of residence and employment in different member states for
purposes of inclusion through citizenship. In more general terms, an
interest in supranational inclusion would be satisfied if TCNs, as
immigrants into the European Union, were able to decide in which
member state to organize their lives, and to change their decisions at
any time, without constraints. This would effectively reduce the
difference between immigrants’ conditions and those of European
citizens.
Improving the condition of TCNs remains a firm commitment in
the framework of the European common immigration policy.
Interests of immigrants also find mention in very recent policy
documents and legal texts. According to the words of the 2008 Pact
on Immigration and Asylum, “[t]he European Council stresses the
importance of adopting a policy that enables fair treatment of
175. Presidency Conclusions, supra note 14, ¶¶ 2-3.
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migrants and their harmonious integration into the societies of their
host countries.”176 Consistently, under the terms of the prospective
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: “The Union shall
develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all
stages, . . . fair treatment of TCNs residing legally in the Member
States . . . .”177 In order to develop this policy, the European
Parliament and the Council may legislate, in particular, on the
definition of the rights of TCNs residing legally in a member state
and on their rights to move to and reside in other member states.178
Despite this proclaimed commitment to the fair treatment of
immigrants, immigrants’ interest in supranational inclusion conflicts
directly with national interests in distinctiveness: the twenty-seven
member states protect their national distinctiveness by deciding
autonomously who is a national and who is not, by keeping a voice
on admission and residence rights, and by deciding on the kind of
treatment to accord to outsiders. In other words, states are reluctant
to open national boundaries to the claims of immigrants who seek
supranational inclusion. Their reluctance, in this sense, represents an
important obstacle to any ambitious project in the sphere of a
common immigration policy aimed at effectively protecting
immigrants’ interest in inclusion. When it comes to the rules of
admission, treatment of immigrants, and naturalization process,
immigrants’ interest in supranational inclusion tends to become
subordinate to interests in national distinctiveness.
Initially, a balance of this kind may seem legitimate and
satisfactory in the context of the European Union: this is indeed a
union of sovereign states that want to preserve their diversities and
their distinct identities. Protecting a sphere of autonomy for the
member states and respecting their diversity is a fundamental
condition for the advancement of the project of integration.179 The
European Union would lose legitimacy and betray its origins and
176. Council of the European Union, European Pact on Immigration and
Asylum 5 (Sept. 24, 2008), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st134
40.en08.pdf (last visited June 30, 2010).
177. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 79(1).
178. Id. art. 79(4).
179. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(3) (“The
Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.”).
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goals if it merely took the place of the member states, substituting its
own goals for the independent ones of the component states.180
From this perspective, immigrants’ interests in supranational
inclusion are quite naturally subordinate to overriding national
interests in distinctiveness. However, before settling for a balance of
this kind in the European Union, one should consider whether a
sacrifice in terms of immigrants’ inclusion effectively adds an
additional measure of national distinctiveness.
It is not only the building of a common immigration policy that
threatens national distinctiveness. The European citizenship, which
brings about free movement and corollary rights for nationals of the
member states, contributes to the penetration and alteration of
distinct national spaces, opening them to naturalized TCNs that
specific member states have never chosen to admit. As a result, the
European citizenship imposes a high toll in terms of national
distinctiveness at the expense of the member states.

D. ENDANGERED DISTINCTIVENESS: THE EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
PERSPECTIVE
European citizenship, through the opportunities that it opens up for
E.U. nationals, erodes the member states’ power to include and
exclude. In particular, the regime of free movement rights that the
European citizenship transmits may be seen as challenging the
effectiveness of the member states’ attempts to protect their national
distinctiveness by autonomously deciding on the admission,
treatment of immigrants, and naturalization process.181
Free movement rights have become a way to extend the same
entitlements of national citizens to E.U. citizens, whom a host
180. Cf. Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative
Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 628, 631-33, 637 (1999) (envisioning European integration as the
ultimate product of administrative delegation evolved through the post-war
constitutional settlement, and arguing that the member states remain the principals
in the European Union).
181. See Karolina Rostek & Gareth Davies, The Impact of Union Citizenship on
National Citizenship Policies, 10 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 5, 1112 (2006), available at http://www.eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/200
6_005a/22 (underlining the interdependence of member states’ nationality policies
as a result of European citizenship and free movement rights).
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member state has not selected as its nationals according to its own
criteria. In this sense, free movement rights and the power to include
and exclude, as expressed in the rules on admission, treatment of
immigrants, and naturalization process, are inversely proportional:
the more free movement rights expand, the more the power of each
member state to include and exclude wanes. At its apex, where free
movement rights allow free moving E.U. citizens to do everything
national citizens can do and to claim everything national citizens can
claim, the power of a member state to include and exclude is
annulled. Each member state becomes de facto subject to any other
member state’s choices of inclusion and exclusion of TCNs.182
The potential corollaries of a recent French case regarding
citizenship provide a telling example in this respect. In June 2008, a
Moroccan woman married to a French man of Moroccan origin
applied to obtain French nationality as the spouse of a French
national. 183 Under French nationality law, one of the requirements
for naturalization is assimilation of the applicant into the French
community.184 The French government can oppose the request of
naturalization on the ground of lack of assimilation, as so happened
in this case; governmental authorities found that the applicant
woman’s engagement in radical religious practices evidenced her
lack of assimilation.185 The Conseil d’Etat upheld the position of the
French government, concluding that the applicant’s practice of a
radical form of Islam and her habit of wearing a niqab were
incompatible with French secular values and with the principle of
equality of the sexes in the Republic.186
This decision raises a number of different concerns: whether
citizenship is the proper context to defend the community from the
fragmenting effects of potentially unwelcome religious practices;
182. See Strumia, supra note 130, at 62-63 (arguing that European citizenship
and its operation reduces member states’ power of self-definition).
183. No. 286798, Conseil D’Etat [CE] (Fr. Jun. 27, 2008) (considering the
applicant’s appeal of a May 16, 2005 decision refusing to grant the applicant
French citizenship).
184. Code Civil (C.CIV.) arts. 21-4, 21-24 (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm.
185. See No. 286798, CE.
186. See id. (asserting that the May 16, 2005 decision neither had the intent to,
nor the effect of, infringing upon the applicant’s rights to religious freedom,
religious expression, or any other fundamental human rights).
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whether a defense of this kind should take place through institutions
other than citizenship; whether denying citizenship to the Moroccan
wife of a French-Moroccan man based on a violation of the principle
of the parity of sexes is denying protection to the very sex that the
logic of the rule is meant to protect; whether the practice of religion
in a private, albeit radical, way can be considered to conflict with the
secular values that a political community is premised on; and
whether cultural assimilation is a necessary element for coexistence
in a civic community, and thus a proper criterion of distinction
between insiders and outsiders. All these questions pose important
issues that cannot be disregarded when reevaluating rationales of
membership in a demographically changing society such as the
European Union. At the same time, the framework of European
citizenship raises questions about the effectiveness of nationality:
protecting the secular values of the national community is a way to
affirm a form of state and national distinctiveness.
The Moroccan woman has the option of moving to another
member state of the European Union, perhaps Belgium, which does
not impose any assimilation requirement to grant nationality.187 She
may reside there for the necessary time and naturalize into Belgian
nationality, thereby becoming a European citizen. At this point, she
could return to France, claim her right to reside there as a European
citizen, exercise some political rights, and claim non-discrimination
on the French labor market.188 The question arises as to whether, as a
resident and European citizen, she poses less of a threat to French
secular values and French distinctiveness than as a French national.
In addition, some day she might apply for French nationality as a
European citizen. French authorities would, at this point, be
confronted with the difficult task of arguing that a European citizen
fails the test of assimilation into French society. Can a person be a
European citizen, an insider in both the European Union and in
another member state, and yet not fit in French society? One could
certainly argue this is the case, and that the fact that one is a national
187. See Code de la Nationalité Belge [Code of Belgian Nationality], as
amended 2006 (1984), available at http://www.juridat.be/cgi_loi/loi_F.pl?cn=1984
062835.
188. See Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 85, art. 20
(prohibiting discriminating against European citizens present in a members state on
the basis of nationality).
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of another member state does not guarantee a good fit in French
society. Yet there would be something jarring in allowing a person to
be a European citizen, with a measure of political voice, a right to
reside, a claim to social inclusion, and an implied assumption of
some shared identity, and yet arguing that this person does not fit in a
given national social fabric well enough to be a national citizen.
The case of Mme. M. illustrates how, in the wake of the extension
and consolidation of the rights of European citizenship, the power of
member states to protect national distinctiveness by autonomously
including and excluding tends gradually to disappear.
The independent choice of a member state to include TCNs by
granting them national citizenship affects all other member states.
Because these TCNs also obtain European citizenship though
national citizenship, other member states are no longer free to deny
them admission or otherwise limit their rights. On the other hand, the
choice of a member state to exclude TCNs by denying them
admission or naturalization may be deprived of its effect if the
excluded TCN obtains European citizenship through another member
state. Member states that pursue distinctiveness by firmly holding
some powers over immigration are losing those same powers at the
hand of European citizenship.

E. THE CHALLENGE OF DISTINCTIVENESS AND INCLUSION IN LIGHT
OF A COMMON IMMIGRATION POLICY
In an effort to build a common immigration policy and set its
priorities, the toll imposed by European citizenship and its dynamics
on national distinctiveness should not be forgotten. This leads to
questioning the wisdom of sacrificing immigrants’ interests in
supranational inclusion for the sake of an otherwise endangered
national distinctiveness.
In particular, in rethinking the balance between national
distinctiveness and immigrants’ inclusion, two elements should be
taken into account. First, the E.U. immigrants’ interest in
supranational inclusion is important. It may serve broader
immigration policy and integration goals: immigrants who are
mobile on the internal market in a way comparable to European
citizens may more readily respond to discrepancies between the
supply and the demand for employment in different parts of the
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European Union. It may even be easier for an immigrant to relocate
from one member state to another than it is for a European citizen,
provided that the immigrant has a right to do so and would not lose
residence time for naturalization purposes.189 In addition, protecting
supranational inclusion may aid in avoiding the consolidation of
artificial insider/outsider divisions between immigrants and
European citizens, whereby the latter are free to move on an
integrated internal market, while the former are constrained within
the economic and political space of a single member state. This
distinction may be detrimental for the long-term integration of
immigrants, their evolving sense of European-ness, and, ultimately,
their blending into European society. Finally, protecting interests of
supranational inclusion may help to correct paradoxical situations
where similarly situated immigrants face disparate legal treatments in
the European Union. Presently, immigrants who have benefited from
more liberal naturalization laws, through having entered the
European Union more recently, may find themselves in more
advantageous positions than immigrants who perhaps have resided
and worked in the European Union longer, but face harsher
requirements for naturalization, or have resided in multiple states
without satisfying the requirements for citizenship for any of those
states.190
A second element to take into account is the other ways that exist
to protect immigrants’ interests in supranational inclusion without
detracting from national distinctiveness more than the operation of
the European citizenship already has; interests in inclusion do not
require central rule or complete harmonization of rules on admission,
189. European citizens have proven quite reluctant to concretely take advantage
of rights of free movement. As of 2006, only about 8 million European citizens, or
about two percent of the population of the European Union, reside in a member
state other than the one of their nationality. ALAIN LAMASSOURE, LE CITOYEN ET
L’APPLICATION DU DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE, RAPPORT AU PRÉSIDENT DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE 9, Jun. 8, 2008 (Fr.), available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentation
francaise.fr/BRP/084000379/0000.pdf; see also PIONEUR Res. Group, Pioneers
of European Integration ‘From Below’: Mobility and the Emergence of European
Identity Among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU, 5th Framework ProgramEur.
Comm’n,
Final
Conf.
(Mar.
6,
2006),
available
at
http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/difusion/PioneurExecutiveSummary.pdf
(analyzing trends in E.U. migration).
190. See Strumia, supra note 130, at 56-57 (noting that similarly situated
immigrants are potentially treated differently).
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treatment of immigrants, and naturalization process. Many interests
of immigrants in the European Union might be sufficiently protected
through forms of mutual recognition among the member states with
respect to relevant rules.191 For instance, member states may come to
recognize immigrants’ periods of residence in other member states
for purposes of complying with their own residence requirements for
naturalization.192 Additionally, a birth within the territory of another
member state might be equated with birth on the territory of the host
member state for purposes of the naturalization of immigrants’
children.193 Or, a host member state might grant leniency in the
language requirements for naturalization if an immigrant is making
an effort to learn the official language of a different member state.194
Reforms in this direction would not necessarily open the borders of
member states more than they have already been forced open through
the process of integration and the operation of European citizenship.
Internal borders would remain thick where a member state wants
them thick, but they would become somewhat more flexible.
The current balance between national distinctiveness and
immigrants’ inclusion in the European Union is precarious: the kind
of national distinctiveness that may be protected by setting aside
interests of Europe-wide inclusion is endangered by the very
operation of European citizenship. It would be unhelpful to avoid
more daring choices in common immigration policy with the excuse
of protecting distinctiveness. It might result in a dangerous zero-sum
game, where both distinctiveness and inclusion are defeated.

CONCLUSION
In both the United States and the European Union, allocating the
power to decide on the admission, treatment, and naturalization of
immigrants between the center and the periphery raises the challenge
of accommodating competing interests of immigrants in inclusion
and individual states in distinctiveness.

191. See id. at 59-61 (suggesting that the value of citizenship in ordering the
coexistence of states and in the preservation of individual communities would not
be diminished ).
192. Id. at 60.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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At first glance, the United States and the European Union seem to
respond to such a challenge in different ways. The United States
appears to favor immigrants’ interest in inclusion, where thin internal
borders reveal that states have little say with respect to the
admission, treatment, and naturalization of immigrants. On the other
hand, the European Union appears to favor state distinctiveness,
where member states retain relatively thick borders in the same
domains.
An alternative narrative indicates, however, that the United States
and the European Union are quite consistent in their pursuits: choices
in immigration and citizenship matters hide the intention to preserve
and reinforce national distinctiveness. Apparent initial contrasts with
respect to state distinctiveness thus find partial reconciliation in
considerations of national distinctiveness.
It is the immigrants who face different destinies with respect to
their comparable interests in inclusion: immigrants’ interests blend
with interests in national distinctiveness and find de facto
accommodation in the United States. There, immigrants, like U.S.
citizens, are free to move among the several states and plan their
lives in any one of them. In the European Union, immigrants’
interests conflict directly with national distinctiveness and tend to
remain subordinate. Consequently, immigrants are constrained to the
physical and legal space of one particular member state.
The balance of national distinctiveness and immigrants’ inclusion
is a fragile one in the European Union: reluctant choices with respect
to common immigration policy tend to sacrifice an important interest
of immigrants in supranational inclusion for the sake of a national
distinctiveness already otherwise endangered by the corollaries of
European citizenship. The quest for distinctiveness and inclusion,
which raise shared challenges for the United States and the European
Union and their policies on immigration and citizenship, appears
particularly pressing in the European Union, and calls for an
immigration policy consciously aiming for a synergy of results.

